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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the reality television star and Hilton hotel heiress Paris
Hilton sued Hallmark Cards for violating her right of publicity under
California statutory and common law. Hilton claimed that when
Hallmark used her image and catchphrase “that’s hot” 1 on a humorous
birthday card without her permission, they violated her exclusive right
under California law to exploit her identity for commercial purposes.2
The card ridiculed a scene from an episode of the reality television show
The Simple Life, which featured Hilton working as a fast-food waitress. 3
The litigation spanned over three years at the district court and appellate
levels before the parties finally settled. 4
The right of publicity protects an individual’s identity—generally
her name, photograph, or likeness—from commercial appropriation by
1 THAT’S HOT, U.S. Registration No. 3,209,488, Class 25; THAT’S HOT, U.S. Trademark
Application Serial No. 85/156,230, Class 41 (filed Oct. 19, 2010); THAT’S HOT, U.S.
Trademark Application Serial No. 85/901,443, Class 33 (filed Apr. 11, 2013).
2 See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded, 599
F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010).
3 For a picture of the card, see Paris Sues over Hallmark Card, THE SMOKING GUN (Sept. 7,
2007),
http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/celebrity/paris-hilton-sues-over-hallmarkcard.
4 The parties settled for an undisclosed amount, however, Hilton sought $500,000 in
damages in the lawsuit. See Hallmark Settles with Paris Hilton over “That’s Hot” Card, N.Y.
POST, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/hallmark_settles_with_paris_
hilton_PWZPgl5p0pjtpOZb01HAWL.
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others without her consent. 5 The right is fully transferable and functions
as both a positive and negative right. 6 As a positive right, the right of
publicity grants the rights owner (which can be the individual or an
assignee) 7 with the exclusive right to license the use of the protected
identity for commercial purposes; as a negative right, it empowers the
rights owner to prevent others from commercially exploiting the
protected identity without the owner’s consent. 8
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (“One who appropriates
the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness,
or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate
under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”); see, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney
2013).
6 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(noting that one’s right of publicity in a photograph, for example, is the “right to grant the
exclusive privilege of publishing [the photograph], and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in
gross’”).
7 Ownership of publicity rights may be held by someone other than the individual whose
identity the right protects. And the question of who owns one’s publicity rights is distinct from
the question of who owns intellectual property rights in that individual’s output. For example, in
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), the court concluded that Bette Midler
retained the publicity rights associated with the use of her distinct voice and sound as an
identifier, even though the copyright over a song she performed belonged to someone else and
was properly licensed for commercial use by an advertiser. The Midler case involved the use of a
Bette Midler sound-alike to perform a slightly edited version of the licensed song Do You Want
To Dance. The court acknowledged the valid license, but concluded “[w]e need not and do not go
so far as to hold that every imitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. We hold
only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately
imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have
committed a tort in California.” Id. at 463. See infra note 163 for further discussion of the case.
The state-based right of publicity often runs in conflict with federal intellectual property
laws, particularly copyright law. When the right of publicity claimant seeks to protect an element
of “identity” that is already protected under federal copyright law, the publicity claim is expressly
preempted under Section 301 of the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012); see infra note 163
and discussion therein. For example, as the Midler court explained, “[i]f Midler were . . . seeking
to prevent the defendants from using that song [which they properly purchased a license to use],
she would fail [ ]. But that is not this case. Midler does not seek damages for Ford’s use of ‘Do
You Want To Dance,’ and thus her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law. Copyright
protects ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.’ 17 U.S.C. §
102(a). A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not ‘fixed.’ What is put forward as
protectible here is more personal than any work of authorship.” Id. at 462. In effect, this means
there is an implied limitation on even properly licensed copyrights: while the copyright licensee
may have the right to use the original recording, they do not have the right to use a sound-alike to
perform a slightly altered cover, let alone an entirely new song. See infra Part III.B for continued
discussion of the conflicts between copyright law and the right of publicity.
8 There is a split as to whether the right of publicity is a property-based or natural (personal
or dignitary) right. The classification distinction is important because it affects the calculation of
damages and assignability of the right. Personal rights are typically not assignable or descendible,
while property rights may be transferred, assigned, or inherited. Further, the damages
computation for an invasion of a personal right, such as privacy, is focused on compensating for
personal loss and emotional distress, while compensation for the violation of a property-based
right is concerned primarily with economic damage. See infra Part II.B.2.
Generally, common law jurisdictions, like the United States, adopt the property approach,
while civil law jurisdictions treat publicity as a personal right. GILLIAN BLACK, PUBLICITY
RIGHTS AND IMAGE 12–19 (2011). The right of publicity statutes in Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
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Generally, all individuals are entitled to the publicity rights over
their identities. 9 Yet, due to the high costs of litigation and the
comparatively low damages that a private individual can collect if
successful in a right of publicity suit, 10 cases involving non-celebrities
are rare. 11 Nonetheless, as the reality television industry expands in the
United States, 12 so too does the number of right of publicity cases filed
by reality television stars. 13
Oklahoma, and Washington all expressly state that publicity is a property right. Id. at 14 n.25.
However, Professor McCarthy seems to take a natural rights approach. See J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (2d ed. 2009) (defining the right of
publicity as “the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her
identity”). Other American scholars maintain that the right of publicity is a property right. See,
e.g., David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 71, 73 n.3, 78 n.26 (2005); George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of Celebrity:
Persona as Property, 51 LA. L. REV. 443, 452 (1991). In contrast, some countries simply do not
recognize publicity rights. See generally HUW BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY
AND PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION (2005). For
example, the United Kingdom protects celebrities’ ability to control their images with privacy and
breach of confidence laws, not publicity laws. BLACK, supra at 25–27; cf. Douglas v. Hello! Ltd.,
[2007] UKHL 21; [2008] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 1.
9 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.13; see infra Part II.
10 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.3 (“That most reported . . . [right of publicity cases] have
involved widely known ‘celebrities’ is to be expected. For it is their identities which have the
greatest commercial value and hence are the most likely to be used for advertising and the most
likely to justify the expense of litigation and appeal.”).
11 Some jurisdictions require a noncelebrity plaintiff to prove first that her name, image, or
likeness had commercial value prior to the defendant’s use. See, e.g., Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co.,
948 F. Supp. 40, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1996). However, the Restatement notes that even unknown persons’
identities may have commercial value. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(b),
cmt. d (1995); see also id. § 49, cmt. d (1995) (“Private persons may also recover damages
measured by the value of the use by establishing the market price that the defendant would have
been required to pay in order to secure similar services from other private persons or from
professional models.”).
12 Gary Levin, ‘Simple Economics’: More Reality TV, USA TODAY, May 9, 2007, at 1D
(noting the growth of reality television programming for reasons including low production costs
and viewer demand for such programs).
13 See, e.g., John Devenanzio v. Home Box Office, Inc., No. 11111261/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
dismissed Apr. 19, 2012) (dismissing for failure to state a claim Devenanzio’s complaint of
alleged right of publicity violation by scripted television series’ use of a cartoon character named
“Bananas,” which also happened to be the nickname of the former Real World reality show
participant); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Kardashian v. The Gap, Inc., Case No. 2:11cv-05960 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2011) (claiming broadcast advertisement used a look-alike of the
reality television star, thereby invoking her identity without her consent; settled Aug. 28, 2012);
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded, 599 F.3d 894
(9th Cir. 2010) (claiming humorous card with reality television star’s image violated her right of
publicity); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal 2002) (dismissing on First
Amendment grounds Bands on the Run reality show participant-plaintiff’s claim of right of
publicity violation when the producer and distributor used her image from show footage to
advertise the show content); see also Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011)
(dismissing on First Amendment grounds arrestee-plaintiff’s claim that inclusion of footage of
her arrest on reality television show Female Forces violated her right of publicity); Ingerson v.
Twentieth Century Fox Films Corp., Nos. B152689, B153595, 2003 WL 147771 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 21, 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003) (affirming summary judgment under a “public
affairs” exception to deny plaintiff’s claim that the use of his unaltered voice on Cops reality
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Reality television stars, however, are different from talent-based
celebrities (actors, musicians, athletes, etc.). Reality television stars are
famous for performing as “themselves,” 14 while, talent-based
celebrities’ fame exists in part as a result of cultivated talents that they
choose to share with the public. For example, actors are famous for
skills that enable them to convincingly portray other characters, and
musicians and athletes are famous for performances that display their
musical talents or athletic abilities. 15 Reality television stars generally
lack these foundational skill sets. 16 Instead, their fame is based on the
exploitation of persona on broadcast television shows, which provide
viewers with a window into what purports to be the participants’
“private lives.” 17
When fame (and monetization of that fame) is built primarily upon
the exploitation of persona—namely performance and publication of the
purported private 18—a difficult question arises as to when the
performance ends. In the case of the legal rights of reality television
stars, a crucial question is where to locate reality. When the rules of the
game require performing as “oneself,” the boundary lines between life
and performance blur dangerously close to indistinction. And when
fame is based on the exploitation of persona, it also necessarily calls
television show violated his right of publicity); Verified Complaint, Page v. Bravo Network, No.
2009-L-010125 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Aug. 26, 2009) (claiming right of publicity violated because
participant in speed dating event did not consent to the footage appearing on Real Housewives
reality television show).
14 CBS Broad. Inc., v. ABC, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8813, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258, at *32
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 13, 2003) (“As to the characters or the contestants, both [reality] shows use
multiple, real people playing themselves.”); Thom Klohn, Does Being on a Reality TV Show Hurt
or
Help
Aspiring
Actors?,
BACKSTAGE,
Dec.
29,
2010,
7:25
pm,
http://www.backstage.com/advice-for-actors/professional-tips/does-being-on-a-reality-tv-showhurt-or-help-aspiring-actors/ (quoting Jodi Collins of Jodi Collins Casting and Productions, New
York) (“Reality stars, for the most part, are people who are famous for being famous. It’s more
personality-driven. It’s less about the quality of work that somebody’s bringing and more about a
personality.”); cf. Johnny Devenanzio, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm2604856/ (last
visited Aug. 28, 2013) (listing all roles as “Himself”); Nicole Richie, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm1421588/?ref_=sr_1 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (listing the
majority
of
roles
as
“Herself”);
Paris
Hilton,
IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0385296/?ref_=fn_al_nm_1 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013) (listing
the majority of roles as “Herself”).
15 See David Leichtman et al., Transformative Use Comes of Age in Right of Publicity
Litigation, LANDSLIDE, Sept./Oct. 2011, at 28, 36 (“‘Famous for being famous,’ reality stars, for
the most part, lack the foundational skill set of celebrity musicians, actors, or athletes.”).
16 Id.
17 See Charles B. Slocum, The Real History of Reality TV, or, How Alan Funt Won the Cold
War,
WRITERS
GUILD
OF
AMERICA,
WEST,
available
at
http://www.wga.org/organizesub.aspx?id=1099 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013); infra Part II.
18 Private may include documentary-style reality show productions, but may also simply
encompass performance as self, as opposed to a distinct and separate character. A broad
definition of the purported private will cover most performances on reality television if we
consider the self to be what is private and not traditionally displayed on standard scripted
television programs.
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into question the reality television star’s purpose and motive behind
every other public act or statement made outside a reality show—
including the use of right of publicity claims in lawsuits.
More troubling, in many cases, the reality television star’s
performed self is more adequately labeled as a constructed persona—in
effect, a character. In these instances, the reality star alleging a right of
publicity violation improperly asks the court to extend state-based
publicity law to protect a character, which properly falls under the
exclusive domain of federal copyright law. 19 In this sense, broad
publicity rights for reality stars may lead to unjust enrichment—
granting the reality star with more protection and opportunity to control
the monetization of their performances than copyright law affords to
traditional celebrities. In addition to providing reality television stars
with a form of unjust enrichment, broad right of publicity protection for
reality television stars also denies the public fair access to reference
these stars’ identities when commenting on the modern societal
phenomenon of reality television fame. 20
This Note takes a critical look at the right of publicity in the
context of the growth of the reality television industry and, for strong
policy reasons, 21 proposes a broad fair use defense to limit reality
television stars’ right of publicity claims. Part I traces the formulation of
the right to privacy at common law and the development of the right of
publicity as a right distinct from privacy. Part II discusses whom the
right of publicity protects, what reality television is, and how reality
television stars are different from talent-based celebrities. Part III
examines how broad publicity protection can conflict with copyright
law, and the specific copyright preemption issues that arise when reality
television stars are granted broad publicity rights; it also analyzes the
justifications for the right of publicity and questions their application to
reality television stars’ claims. Part IV outlines the First Amendment
defense to right of publicity claims, the public’s interest in accessing
celebrity identity for communicative purposes, and the inadequacy of
19
20
21

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.
These policy reasons include the protection of First Amendment interests, as well as the
reduction of social costs associated with expansive right of publicity laws. Even strong
proponents of the right of publicity have cautioned that there may be policy reasons to check
publicity rights. See SHELDON W. HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY
AND “MORAL RIGHTS” 515 (1988) (“The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial value.
A celebrity’s persona confers an associative value, or economic enhancement, upon the
marketability of product. Whether we like commercialization of personality or not, the economic
reality persists—the marketplace recognizes an associative economic value. As a matter of policy,
the courts determine the extent to which one must compensate the person who has generated that
value and the limits of the celebrity’s control over the exploitation of his or her personality.”);
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)
(“[E]very person is entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing
public policy considerations.”); see also infra Parts III.A, III.C, IV.
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the First Amendment tests currently adopted by the courts. Part V
proposes a broad fair use defense to limit reality television stars’
publicity rights in order to prevent unjust enrichment and to grant the
public with the unencumbered ability to participate in the construction
of meaning in reality star and celebrity culture. 22
I. BACKGROUND ON PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY LAWS
A. Overview of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity developed in the United States during the
twentieth century as an offshoot of the right to privacy, 23 which itself
developed at common law around the turn of the nineteenth century. 24
Originally covered as an appropriation tort in privacy law, 25 the right of
publicity now exists in many states as a separate right recognized by
state statute, common law, or both. 26
22 Although there are many reasons to abolish the right of publicity, see infra Parts III, IV,
and notes 75–79, this Note does not argue for its abolition. The strongest cases for the right of
publicity are instances of appropriations of a performer’s entire act, as in Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), and those where a celebrity objects to an
appropriation because she denied or would have denied permission for the use, as in Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992). In Waits, a chips advertisement featured a soundalike of musician Tom Waits—well known for his position against licensing his music for
advertisements—despite his express refusal to lend his voice for the advertisement. Notably
though, both Zacchini and Waits could have likely prevailed without the right of publicity on
unfair competition or false endorsement grounds. See infra notes 61–64, 213, and Part II.C.
Nevertheless, the narrow issue this Note addresses is the extent of right of publicity protection for
reality television stars.
23 For the first judicial mention and coinage of the phrase “right of publicity,” see Haelan
Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). The Second Restatement of
Torts originally classified the right of publicity as an appropriation tort under privacy law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977) (emphasis added) (“The right of privacy is
invaded by: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or (c) unreasonable
publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D; or (d) publicity that unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public, as stated in § 652E.”).
24 For the first formulation of the right to privacy, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
25 For an argument that privacy actually consists of four distinct torts, including an
appropriation tort that is now referred to as the right of publicity, see William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960). See also supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text; infra Parts
I.C–D.
26 For an early article arguing for recognition of the right of publicity as separate from the
right to privacy, see Nimmer, supra note 21. California, for example, maintains both a common
law and statutory right of publicity, thus providing greater protection for individuals seeking to
protect their publicity rights. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2010), limited as noted by Jules
Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) (preempting right of
publicity claim over the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of DVDs by federal copyright
law because the asserted right of publicity claim was equivalent to the also asserted federal
copyright infringement claim); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We
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The right of publicity, however, does not grant owners with an
absolute right over the use of an identity for commercial purposes.27
One limit is that the right of publicity only protects an individual’s
actual identity; characters and performances, in contrast, are protected
under copyright law. 28 Furthermore, publicity rights generally privatize
only commercial advertising and merchandizing uses of persona,
whereas informational and educational uses are left in the public
domain. 29 The First Amendment also serves as an important limitation
on publicity rights, as parody, transformative, incidental, and
newsworthy uses of another person’s identity are generally deemed
privileged and thus immune from right of publicity liability. 30
have held that this common-law right of publicity protects more than the knowing use of a
plaintiff’s name or likeness for commercial purposes that is protected by Cal. Civ.[ ]Code
§ 3344.”); Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207, 209 n.2 (Ct.
App. 1997) (“The difference between the common law and the statutory actions is that section
3344 requires a knowing use of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, whereas mistake and
inadvertence are not a defense against commercial appropriation at common law.”). For “[a] rule
which says that the right of publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine different
methods of appropriating identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist to come up
with the tenth.” White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993). New
York, in contrast, only recognizes the statutory right of publicity, which remains labeled under the
privacy statute as an appropriation tort. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2013);
Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, 470 N.Y.S.2d 377 (App. Div. 1984), rev’d, 474 N.E.2d 580
(N.Y. 1984).
27 For example, some commercial uses, even if for profit, are privileged. Vincent M. de
Grandpré, Understanding the Market for Celebrity: An Economic Analysis of the Right of
Publicity, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 82–83 (2001) (“Not all
unauthorized uses of a person’s likeness amount to right of publicity infringement, however:
subject to the applicable statutes, only advertisement and commercial uses trigger liability.
Advertisement is generally defined as the solicitation of patronage ‘intended to promote the sale
of some collateral commodity or service,’ and may include not-for-profit ads. By contrast,
commercial use is a more elusive concept. At its simplest, it implies a use for profit, but the
concept has evolved to mean uses not privileged in the interest of the public. Thus, publishers or
broadcasters are generally sheltered from liability even though they too are profit-making
entities.”).
28 BLACK, supra note 8, at 142.
29 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 129–35 (1993) (noting that in our legal system the ownership of
celebrity rights is split, as the educational and informational uses of personas belong to the public
domain, while advertising and merchandising rights are privately held by the individual or her
assigns; also explaining that merchandizing uses include t-shirts or figurines, and informational
uses include news reporting); de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 82–83. Merchandising generally is a
field that “looks to the value in using image as a marketing tool.” BLACK, supra note 8, at 28.
30 See infra Part IV; U.S. CONST. amend. I. For an example of a statutory exception, see 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1075/35(b)(2) (West 2011) (“This Act does not apply to the . . . use of
an individual’s identity for non-commercial purposes, including any news, public affairs, or
sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign.”). For judicial carve-outs, see New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d, 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding use of persona was protected by the First Amendment when the use was
related to a newsgathering purpose—there a newspaper reader contest) and Dora v. Frontline
Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding newsworthy privilege as a defense to
right of publicity claim brought by surfer against documentary filmmaker). Fictionalized accounts
are also generally insulated from right of publicity liability under the First Amendment, but false
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B. The Development of the Right to Privacy at Common Law
The right to privacy was first formulated in 1890 in an article
entitled The Right to Privacy by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis. 31 Warren and Brandeis wrote their article in response to what
they believed were urgent new threats that the media, photography, and
sound recording devices posed to individuals’ privacy. 32 For the
authors, the media’s offensive invasions into individual’s private lives
demanded that privacy be recognized as a separate common law right to
protect personal, rather than commercial, interests. 33 While existing
laws protected individuals’ property interests in their names,
reputations, and work, 34 Warren and Brandeis posited that underlying
these property interests was the individual’s right to an “inviolate
personality,” 35 which, along with the right “to be let alone,” formed the
basis of privacy. 36 The authors were careful though to note that the right
to privacy was not absolute. Valid defenses would include consent and
the right to publish matters of public concern. 37 As an individual’s right
to be free from unwanted invasion, the right to privacy was only
available to individuals who chose to live outside of the public

accounts are not protected. Compare Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding the fictionalized account of Agatha Christie’s life was protected under
the First Amendment, and noting it would be obvious to the public that the account was not meant
to be factual), with Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Ct. App. 1983) (finding the
false report of a love affair was not protected under the First Amendment, the court was in part
persuaded by its finding that the publication appropriated Eastwood’s persona and published the
false facts in order to increase its circulation), superseded by statute on other grounds, CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3344 (West 2010) (preempted by federal copyright law, see supra note 26), as recognized
in KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 n.5 (Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he statute no
longer requires that the unauthorized use occur in a product advertisement or endorsement or
other such solicitation of purchase. Cases decided under the pre-1984 version of section 3344,
such as Eastwood . . . must be read with this change in mind.”). For an example of the parody
defense, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding humorous cartoon playing cards were sufficiently transformative and that, as
parodies, they were insulated by the First Amendment). Contra White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding the use of a robot in a blond wig in front of a game
board was an unauthorized appropriation of Vanna White’s identity, and not a protected parody).
31 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24.
32 Id. at 195–96 (“For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for
the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons and the evil of the invasion of privacy
by the newspapers . . . . The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency.”).
33 Id. at 196, 213.
34 Id. at 197–206, 210–14 (citing slander, libel, intellectual property, implied contract and
trust, and trade secrets as available laws).
35 Id. at 196, 211.
36 Id. at 195 (quoting THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR
THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT (Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 2d ed.
1888)).
37 Id. at 214, 218.
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spotlight. 38
Although courts were slow to adopt the new right to privacy
espoused by Warren and Brandeis, 39 some state legislatures responded
by enacting laws to protect privacy. 40 In 1939 the First Restatement of
Torts recognized a right to be free from “interference with privacy.” 41
And by the 1950s, the right to privacy was firmly established, with over
three hundred cases filed. 42 Within a decade, twenty-eight states courts
recognized the right to privacy, 43 yet the legal standard and available
remedies were somewhat unclear and chaotic. 44
C. Publicity Emerges
The individual’s right to the commercial value of her image,
distinct from the right to privacy, was first judicially recognized and
named as the “right of publicity” in 1953 in Haelan Laboratories v.

38
39

Id. at 214–15.
See Prosser, supra note 25, at 384, 386. Courts that denied the common law right to privacy
followed Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). “An examination of
the authorities [Blackstone, Kent, and English cases] leads us to the conclusion that the so-called
‘right of privacy’ has not as yet found an abiding place in our jurisprudence, and, as we view it,
the doctrine cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled principles of law by
which the profession and the public have long been guided.” Id. at 447. For a discussion of the
case, see infra note 40. Courts that allowed privacy claims followed Pavesich v. New England
Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), a case involving a similar appropriation as in
Roberson, but the court instead recognizing a common law right to privacy. For a selection of
other relevant cases, see Corliss v. E. W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (D. Mass. 1894) (denying
injunction against publication of plaintiff’s portrait in a biographical sketch because she was a
public figure); Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 26 (N.Y. 1895) (reversing a grant of injunction to
bar display of statue of deceased woman), rev’g 24 N.Y.S. 509 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Mackenzie v.
Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (enjoining defendant from using
physician’s name without his consent to advertise its medicine, but denying damages).
40 In New York, the state legislature adopted a statute in response to public outrage
surrounding the Roberson case, where the Court of Appeals refused to acknowledge the common
law right to privacy and dismissed a young woman’s lawsuit against a company that used her
image to advertise its flour without her consent. Roberson, 64 N.E. 442. For criticism of the
Roberson decision, see Editorial, The Right of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1902, at 8; The Right
of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1902, at 8; German View of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1902, at 5. A New York Court of Appeals judge who concurred in the Roberson decision wrote
an article to explain and defend the decision. Denis O’Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L.
REV. 437 (1902).
41 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (FIRST) § 867 (1939) (“A person who unreasonably and seriously
interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable.”).
42 Prosser, supra note 25, at 389.
43 For a list of the cases, see id. at 386–87 nn.17–43.
44 See id. at 388–89; see also Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d
Cir. 1956), rev’g 126 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (“The state of the law [of privacy] is still that
of a haystack in a hurricane.”). For a discussion of the problems, see Harold R. Gordon, Right of
Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 553, 554 (1961).
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Topps Chewing Gum. 45 Haelan set the stage for the emergence of
publicity as a commercial, fully assignable and transferable, 46 property
right to protect an individual’s commercial interest in the exploitation of
her identity, rather than a personal right to privacy, which merely
protected the individual’s feelings and “right to an inviolate
personality.” 47
A year later, Melville B. Nimmer provided support for the
development of a separate commercial right of publicity in a nowfamous article, The Right of Publicity. 48 Nimmer at the time was
counsel to Paramount Pictures, 49 and he argued that the development of
a separate right of publicity was the “natural” evolution of privacy to
meet the particular needs of Broadway and Hollywood in the midtwentieth century. 50 This move was important for entertainers because
modern advertising, motion picture, television, and radio industries
created new demands on privacy interests that Warren and Brandeis’
formulation failed to meet—notably, celebrities and famous individuals
were often denied relief for privacy violations, as courts found they
waived the right to privacy by becoming public figures. 51 Thus, Nimmer
argued for the recognition of the right of publicity as a distinct,
assignable, property right to protect the commercial interests in identity
without the requisite showing of emotional injury or personal harm that
privacy demanded. 52 Implicit in Nimmer’s article was an acceptance of
45
46
47

Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
The court found the commercial rights must be transferable to have effect. Id.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 211.
For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ballplayers), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines,
busses, trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money
unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other
advertiser from using their pictures.

Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 868. While the court did not expressly label the right of publicity
as a property right in this case, the Second Circuit has since clarified that the right of publicity is a
property right, other jurisdictions do so by statute. See Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v. Fleer Corp.,
799 F.2d 851, 852 (2d Cir. 1986); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text. For a political
discussion of why publicity emerged as a separate right, see Madow, supra note 29.
48 Nimmer, supra note 21.
49 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir.
1996).
50 Nimmer, supra note 21, at 203. To Nimmer’s mind, Warren and Brandeis’ privacy, which
was developed to protect the Boston Brahmins’ private lives from the invasion of the press,
“clearly” could and should be “naturally” expanded to protect celebrities’ commercial interests
outside of their feelings. Id.
51 Id. at 203, 215. Nimmer did not categorically exclude non-celebrities, but noted that the
right of publicity usually only becomes important once the individual has achieved some level of
fame. Id. at 216.
52 Id. at 215. “The substance of the right of publicity must be largely determined by two
considerations: first, the economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second,
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a system where celebrities’ publicity rights can be owned and
commercialized exclusively by the individual and her assignees. 53
D. Privacy in Chaos: Prosser Reins Things In
While the right of publicity was in its infancy, privacy was
becoming established in the American legal system and courts struggled
to define the relation between the two claims. Some courts recognized
the right of publicity as a distinct right, 54 others defined the right of
publicity as part of the right to privacy, and still others continued to
deny the right of publicity in its entirety. 55
In response to the legal uncertainty, Dean Prosser clarified in his
article Privacy that the right to privacy actually consisted of four
distinct torts, or invasions, which had little in common except for their
protection of the individual’s right to be left alone. 56 The fourth tort,
appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or likeness, is what we now refer to
as the right of publicity. 57 While the first three privacy torts protected
the individual’s feelings or reputation, the forth appropriation tort was
distinct in that it alone protected the individual’s commercial interest in
the exclusive use of her “name and likeness as an aspect of [her]
identity.” 58 By the end of the 1960s, despite some criticism of Prosser’s
categorical approach to privacy, 59 this approach ultimately took
the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in protecting such publicity values.” Id.
53 Madow criticizes Nimmer’s article for discounting “community needs” to access and use
celebrity-identity for personal expression and states that “the article can perhaps best be read as a
high-class form of special-interest pleading for the star image industry.” Madow, supra note 29,
at 174, 174–78.
54 See, e.g., Manger v. Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, Inc., 233 F.2d 5, 10 n.5 (2d Cir. 1956);
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Hogan v. A.S.
Barnes & Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957).
55 See Prosser, supra note 25, at 421; see, e.g., Strickler v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 167 F. Supp. 68,
70 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (rejecting the right of publicity).
56 The four torts are “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private
affairs; 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3. Publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Prosser, supra note 25, at 389. For a discussion of
Prosser’s categories as uniquely workable for the American courts, see Paul M. Schwartz & KarlNikolaus Peifer, Prosser’s Privacy and the German Right of Personality: Are Four Privacy Torts
Better than One Unitary Concept?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (2010).
57 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 n.2 (Cal. 2001).
58 Prosser, supra note 25, at 406; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 5:61 (“[T]he right of
publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook, [not] by an injury to the psyche.”).
59 For a critique of Prosser’s approach, see Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 964–66 (1964) (arguing for
a rejection of Prosser’s categories and a return to privacy as a single tort that protects human
dignity because the categories neglected seventy-five years of common law and perverted Warren
and Brandeis’ conception of privacy to protect human dignity). But see Harry Kalvan, Jr., Privacy
in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966)
(arguing Prosser’s categories cut privacy law free from Warren and Brandeis’ formulation and the
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hold 60—paving the way for publicity to become a mainstay in the
American legal system either as an appropriation tort under privacy law
or under a distinct designation of its own.
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co. decided its only right of publicity case to date. 61 In
distinguishing the right of publicity from other privacy rights, the Court
noted, “in ‘right of publicity’ cases the only question is who gets to do
the publishing.” 62 The Court paid heed to countervailing First
Amendment interests, but ultimately found for the plaintiff in that case
because the unauthorized news broadcast appropriated the performer’s
entire act and thus posed a substantial threat to the value of his
performance in the market. 63 The Court cautioned in dicta that if the
unauthorized broadcast in fact increased the value of the performance
by stimulating public interest and increasing attendance, then the
plaintiff would be unable to prove damages or recover in a right of
publicity case. 64
That same year, the newly issued Third Restatement of Unfair
Competition featured the right of publicity as a separate right from the
set of four privacy torts. 65 These developments solidly placed the right
of publicity outside of the realm of a unitary privacy tort. 66 This
distinction remains important because privacy’s goal is to protect the
individual’s personal interests, while publicity protects one’s right to
capture commercial value. 67

confused case law that followed, but stating that the root of privacy is the protection of human
dignity and that privacy law as developed as a tort is petty and does not adequately protect human
dignity).
60 The approach was subsequently adopted by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652A (1977).
61 433 U.S. 562, 573–76 (1977).
62 Id. at 573.
63 “[I]n this case, Ohio has recognized what may be the strongest case for a ‘right of
publicity’ involving, not the appropriation of an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the
attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which the
entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.” Id. at 575–76.
64 Id. at 576 n.12.
65 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995).
66 For a critical discussion of the solidification of the right of publicity since the early 1970s,
see David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 147, 153
(1982). Lange states that
coinciding roughly with the appearance of the trial court’s opinion in Lugosi v.
Universal Pictures Company, Inc. in 1972, the law seemed suddenly to metastasize.
Since then, I would argue, it has developed too rapidly and in too many ill-defined
directions, with the consequence that in numerous instances exclusive rights have been
recognized in contenders who simply have not demonstrated a legitimate claim.
Id.

67

See supra note 47 and infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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E. The Modern Statutory Bases of the Right of Publicity
Today the right of publicity is accepted by twenty-eight states at
common law and nineteen states by statute. 68 In general, all the statutes
protect individuals from the commercial appropriation of their identities
by others without consent—although they vary in the formulations of
identity protected. 69 For example, New York grants protection over a
“name, portrait or picture” 70 while Illinois—having one of the broadest
publicity statutes 71—protects “any attribute of an individual that serves
to identify that individual to an ordinary, reasonable viewer or listener,
including but not limited to (i) name, (ii) signature, (iii) photograph, (iv)
image, (v) likeness, or (vi) voice.” 72 Notably, some states like California
continue to recognize both a common law and statutory right of
publicity. 73
68 Jonathan D. Reichman, United States, in RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 79 (Jonathan D. Reichman
ed., 2011).
69 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2741.01(a) (West 2013). Other differences between the states include descendibility, damages,
and defenses. See Kevin L. Vick & Jean-Paul Jassy, Why a Federal Right of Publicity Statute Is
Necessary, 28 COMM. LAWYER 14, 15–17 (2011). See generally Michael Madow, Personality as
Property: The Uneasy Case for Publicity Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH 349–52 (Peter Yu ed., 2007).
70 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 2013), held constitutional in Rhodes v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 85 N.E. 1097 (N.Y. 1908), aff’d, 220 U.S. 502 (1911). Technically
labeled as an appropriation tort, New York’s publicity statute is treated as a bar to common law
right of publicity. See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
71 Illinois is generally considered to have the most plaintiff-friendly right of publicity laws.
This is attributed, in part, to the fact that Mark Roesler, the CEO of a large Illinois-based celebrity
image management company, was the main author of Illinois’ statute. See Biography, MARK
ROESLER, http://www.markroesler.com/about/biography.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013)
(“CEO Mark Roesler is the exclusive business agent to over 300 celebrities and estates. In 1994,
he was the driving force behind the creation of Indiana’s Right of Publicity Statute, which is one
of the most expansive publicity statutes in the world.”); How Celebs Make a Living After Death,
CBSNEWS
(Jan.
10,
2011),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/06/60minutes/main7219333.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;4
(noting that Roesler saw an opportunity to represent deceased celebrities’ estates in the 1980s and
actively sought to create post-mortem right of publicity extensions in state legislatures and
through the courts; also noting that marketing and licensing of dead celebrities images is an $800
million dollar per year industry, on path for future growth as new technologies emerge). Roesler
had much to gain from a statutory recognition of post-mortem publicity rights given that his fees
start at one-third of the profits, while standard agent’s fees are only ten percent. Nancy Hass, I
Seek Dead People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
72 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075 (West 2013) (Right of Publicity Act).
73 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2013) (protecting “name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness”), limited as noted by Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada Inc., 617 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2010) (preempting right of publicity claim by federal copyright law); see supra note 26
and accompanying text. Jurisdictions that recognize both the common law and statutory right of
publicity are generally more plaintiff-friendly than those where the right is based solely on
statutory law because the common law definition of identity is often broader than the statutory
definition. Compare White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g en
banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
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II. MODERN PUBLICITY LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF REALITY
TELEVISION
A. Overview
Although the right of publicity expanded and became entrenched in
many states in the second half of the twentieth century, 74 the right of
publicity is not without critics. 75 In response to the expansion, several
courts and scholars have questioned the theoretical and legal bases for
the right of publicity. 76 Such criticism often expresses concern for the
First Amendment implications 77 of right of publicity laws and the
detrimental effect that broad right of publicity protection has on a lively
public domain. 78 Even some scholars who support the right of publicity
express caution at any further expansion of the right. 79
The late twentieth century also saw the rise of reality television: a
new form of television programming, which generally is “something
constructed to resemble reality, where a camera crew follows people
around while they do something.” 80 With the growth of the reality
banc) (finding defendant’s robot with a blond wig in front of a Wheel of Fortune-like game board
violated Vanna White’s right of publicity at common law, even though the California publicity
statute did not list “robots” as a protectable category of identity), with Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F.
Supp. 2d 446, 448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding Mars’ use of a “naked cowboy” M&M cartoon in
an advertisement did not violate the real “Naked Cowboy” Times Square street performer’s right
of publicity because the “New York statute protects the name, portrait, or picture of a ‘living
person,’ not a character created or a role performed by a living person”).
74 See supra Parts I.C–D.
75 See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern
Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992); David Tan,
Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS
& ENT. L. 1 (2011); de Grandpré, supra note 27; Madow, supra note 29.
76 See supra notes 30, 75 and accompanying text. The expansion of the right of publicity is
also questionable given the economic benefit that some advocates for expanded publicity rights,
like Mark Roeser, have received as a result of the expansion. See supra note 71.
77 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
903 (2003) (arguing that the right of publicity is unconstitutional).
78 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 969, 972–
73 (10th Cir. 1996); Lange, supra note 66, at 160–78.
79 See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.38 (“[T]he right of publicity should be kept as close as
possible to its basic rationale of a natural right of every human being to control commercial uses
of human identity and persona. To stretch the right of publicity beyond its basic reason for
existence is to blindly follow superficial semantic analogies.”); id. §4.45 (stating the right should
not be extended to protect the identity of businesses or institutions); id. at § 4.37; infra note 83.
80 James Frey, Forward to REALITY MATTERS: 19 WRITERS COME CLEAN ABOUT THE
SHOWS WE CAN’T STOP WATCHING xi (Anna David ed., 2010). See also ANNETTE HILL,
REALITY TV: AUDIENCES AND POPULAR FACTUAL TELEVISION 2 (2005). One reason for the rise
of reality television programming is the high profit margin to producers. See The Real Deal on
Reality
TV,
CBSNEWS,
(Sept.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/07/sunday/main6183037.shtml (“[A]n hour of reality
can cost a few hundred thousand dollars, compared to the one to three million for a scripted
drama.”). For a discussion of the economics of reality television, see Kimberlianne Podlas,
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television industry came the reality television star, or “nonebrity” 81—a
new form of entertainment star. As this industry expands, so do the
number of right of publicity lawsuits filed by reality television stars. 82
In order to understand why reality television stars’ right of publicity
claims should be treated differently than traditional celebrities’ claims,
one must first explore whom the right of publicity protects, what exactly
reality television is, and how reality television stars are different from
traditional entertainment celebrities.
B. Whose Right Is It Anyway?
The right of publicity protects the commercial value of an
individual’s identity from use in trade without her consent. 83 The main
difference between the right of publicity and privacy are the different
interests they protect: the right of publicity protects commercial
interests, while the right to privacy protects personal interests. 84 The
distinction between the interests that privacy and publicity protect is key
because it reflects the United States’ approach to publicity as a property
right, rather than an inherent dignitary interest, like privacy. 85 As a
property-based right, publicity rights are transferable and, in some
states, descendible. 86 Privacy rights, in contrast, are vested with the
individual and cannot be transferred or inherited. 87
Courts split over whether the right of publicity protects all
individuals or only those who have achieved a certain level of fame.
Primetime Crimes: Are Reality Television Programs “Illegal Contests” in Violation of Federal
Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 141, 145–48 (2007).
81 Nonebrity,
URBAN
DICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=nonebrity (last visited Aug. 28, 2013)
(“Somebody who manages to maintain celebrity status despite having done nothing to merit it.”);
Shandra Clark, The Era of the “Nonebrity”, YAHOO! VOICES (Dec. 31, 2009),
http://http://voices.yahoo.com/the-era-nonebrity-5171271.html.
82 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
83 The right of publicity protects natural persons, not corporations or institutions. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(d) (1995) (“The interest in personal
dignity and autonomy that underlies both publicity and privacy rights limits application of the
right of publicity to natural persons. The protection available against the unauthorized use of
corporate or institutional identities is determined by the rules governing trademarks and trade
names.”). An open and largely unlitigated question is whether animals should be entitled to
publicity rights. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.37 (“Some [scholars] have proposed that
animals, from household pets to animal celebrities, have a right of publicity in their identity. The
logical difficulty is that this stretches the right of publicity beyond its rationale of a natural right
in human identity.”).
84 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(a), (b) (1995); supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 8, 47 and the discussions therein.
86 J. Thomas McCarthy, Public Personas and Private Property: The Commercialization of
Human Identity, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 681, 687 (1989).
87 BLACK, supra note 8, at 17–18.
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The majority of courts and scholars hold that the right of publicity
protects all individuals, 88 and fame only affects the calculation of
damages. 89 A minority of courts, however, hold that only celebrities are
entitled to the right of publicity. 90 Under the minority approach, a
private individual’s claim is denied when she cannot prove her celebrity
status to demonstrate that her identity had commercial value prior to the
defendant’s use. 91 However, even in jurisdictions that allow private
individuals’ right of publicity claims, these cases are rare because
recovery is limited to the market price for the use of a private
individual’s identity 92—generally quite low, and far less than a
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. 93 Thus, private individuals are generally
better off pursuing claims under privacy law, where damages cover
personal injuries, as well as emotional harm. 94
Private individuals also rarely win right of publicity cases in the
event of media appropriations, because media defendants are insulated
under the First Amendment and most state statutes permit unauthorized
appropriations that cover matters of public interest or concern. 95
88
89

MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.13.
Even unknown persons’ identities may have commercial value. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(b), cmt. d (1995); cf. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.11 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he appropriation of the identity of a
relatively unknown person may result in economic injury or may itself create economic value in
what was previously valueless.”); Dora v Frontline Video Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792 n.2 (Ct.
App. 1993) (“Appellant [a surfing legend] is not a celebrity in terms of the general public, but the
evidence in this case establishes that he achieved a certain celebrity among those members of the
surfing sub-culture to whom the program would be of interest. It is therefore safe to say that
under any standard his name and likeness were commercially exploitable to some extent.”).
90 See Uhlig LLC v. Shirley, C.A. No. 6:08–cv–01208–JMC, 2011 WL 1119548 (D.S.C.
Mar. 25, 2011) (holding that under South Carolina law only celebrities can allege right of
publicity claims and granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff, a
well-regarded salesman, was not a celebrity); House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d
684, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (“An action for appropriation [in Minnesota] has not been
extended beyond the protection of celebrities because a ‘celebrity’s property interest in his name
and likeness is unique.’” (quoting Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn.
1970))).
91 Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 592 (D.C. 1985) (finding that a
noncelebrity plaintiff could not prove there was “value” in her photograph).
92 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49, cmt. d (1995) (“Private
persons many also recover damages measured by the value of the use by establishing the market
price that the defendant would have been required to pay in order to secure similar services from
other private persons or from professional models.”).
93 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.3 (“That most reported appellate opinions on the right of
publicity have involved widely known ‘celebrities’ is to be expected. For it is their identities
which have the greatest commercial value and hence are the most likely to be used for advertising
and the most likely to justify the expense of litigation.”).
94 See, e.g., Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 275–77 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
defendant liable for invasion of privacy for misappropriating plaintiff’s name).
95 See Best v. Berard, 776 F. Supp. 2d 752 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that the First Amendment
shielded television production companies from civil liability under the Illinois Right of Publicity
Act when they publicized plaintiff’s arrest on reality television show Female Forces because the
commercial use of the plaintiff’s identity implicated a matter of public concern, namely truthful
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In some instances, the right of publicity may be reserved or denied
for a specific group of people. In Arizona, for example, a special
criminal right of publicity statute was enacted to protect the publicity
rights of soldiers. 96 In contrast, politicians’ rights of publicity are
limited 97 because the appropriation of a politician’s identity is often
protected under the First Amendment as political speech. 98
C. A Close Cousin: Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act
State-based right of publicity claims are often pled in conjunction
with federal false endorsement claims under Section 1125(a) of the
Lanham Act, 99 which prohibits the use of false or misleading
footage of an arrest); Ingerson v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Nos. B152689, B153595,
2003 WL 147771 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (finding appropriation of identity on Cops reality
television show did not violate an individual’s right of publicity because the show covered police
enforcement, which is a matter of public concern); cf. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d
469 (Cal. 1998) (denying plaintiff’s privacy claim for disclosure of private facts when production
company included images of plaintiff’s rescue on a reality television show that covered rescue
workers because the rescue and medical treatment of accident victims, coverage of critical
services that members of the public may someday need, and challenges facing emergency
workers dealing with serious accidents were all matters of legitimate public concern). Public
concern is usually defined broadly to include matters related to a “political, social, or other
concern to the community,” as well as items of legitimate news interest. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011).
96 For example, Arizona and Oklahoma enacted criminal right of publicity statutes, which
make violating the right of publicity of current or former members of the armed services a
misdemeanor. AZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3726 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1A
(West 2006).
97 Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d
697 (Ga. 1982). In privacy actions, politicians’ claims are also generally denied because they are
found to have waived their right to privacy by becoming public figures. See N.Y. Magazine v.
Metro. Transit Auth., 987 F. Supp. 254, 256–57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Giuliani chose to
be a public figure by becoming mayor and therefore could not avoid unwanted publicity).
98 See generally Tyler T. Ochoa, The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction and
Statement of Facts, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (2005) (discussing constitutional limitations on
politicians’ right of publicity claims). Cf. MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.23 (noting that
politicians waive their privacy claims and that political speech is protected under the First
Amendment, arguing however that politicians’ right of publicity claims should be allowed when
political speech is not implicated).
99 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). Section 1125(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, “False designations of
origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden” states
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
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designations of origin, descriptions, and representations in the
advertising and sale of goods and services. 100 Section 1125(a) functions
primarily to protect consumers from confusion as to the source or
endorsement of goods. 101 While the right of publicity protects against
unauthorized appropriations of identity, Section 1125(a) only protects
against deceptive appropriations that create a likelihood of confusion in
consumers as to source or endorsement. 102 Yet, a finding that both
Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act and the right of publicity were
violated does not necessarily result in a larger award of damages, as the
damages may be limited to avoid duplicative awards. 103
D. What Am I Watching?
Reality television is a form of entertainment programming that
involves real people and is designed to create an illusion of reality. 104
The field is quite broad and covers a range of genres including life
dramas, competitions, game shows, and surveillance shows. 105 The first
reality shows were televised in the mid-twentieth century, usually in
either quiz show format or one involving staged scenes with hidden
cameras. 106 Examples of early reality television shows include Candid
Camera and What’s My Line. 107 In 1973, PBS was ahead of its time
when it aired An American Family—a novel show covering a real
family that over the course of the season televised the parents’ divorce

commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
to be damaged by such act.
100 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992).
101 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399–1400 (9th Cir. 1992). See
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) for an example
of a case where the Section 1125 claim was denied because the court found no likelihood of
confusion. Despite that, the court ultimately found Carson’s right of publicity was violated under
state law. Id. at 835–36.
102 White, 971 F.2d at 1399. If a celebrity’s identity is appropriated but there is no confusion in
consumers as to source or endorsement, then the Section 1125(a) claim will be dismissed. See
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997–1001 (2d Cir. 1989).
103 See Waits, 978 F.2d at 1112 (“The jury’s verdict on each claim is supported by substantial
evidence, as are its damage awards. Its award of damages on Waits’ Lanham Act claim, however,
is duplicative of damages awarded for voice misappropriation; accordingly we vacate it.”).
104 Frey, supra note 80, at xi.
105 DR. MELISSA CAUDLE, THE REALITY OF REALITY TV WORKBOOK 6–7 (2011) (describing
the main genres as documentary, game show, life drama, celebrity, professional, paranormal,
dating show, makeover, competition, surveillance shows, and talk show). The possible purposes
of a reality television show include to induce one to tell a story, teach something, entertain, cover
a social issue, display someone winning, change a life, set people up, cover political issues, and to
turn an unknown person into a “realebrity.” Id. at 7.
106 Slocum, supra note 17; Podlas, supra note 80, at 144.
107 Slocum, supra note 17.
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and the homosexual son’s “coming out” moment. 108 In response to TV
Guide listing An American Family as a documentary, famed
anthropologist Margaret Mead wrote an article contesting the
categorization. 109 In the article, Mead expressed strong support for the
format as a possible “new way to help people understand themselves,”
but noted that a new category of classification was needed to describe
the genre. 110
An American Family though was a forerunner for narrative reality
show series, 111 as the majority of reality shows in the 1970s and 80s
reflected the development of portable video cameras and consisted
primarily of ordinary people caught on film in interesting situations or
humorous moments. 112 The major milestone in the reality television
genre was MTV’s creation of the Real World series. This series
employed various production techniques such as staging, casting,
interviewing, and advanced editing to construct characters and
storylines for the episodes. 113 The Real World series set the stage for the
highly-produced reality programs that are now typical of the genre in
the early twenty-first century. 114
Far from simply recording reality, modern reality television shows
are engaged in character and reality construction that occurs in various
manners during the pre-production, filming, and post-production
stages. 115 The pre-production construction includes the selection of
participants, show setting, and general show plot or theme. During
filming, writers and producers play a large role 116 by writing episode
storylines, developing show characters, and, at times, providing lines to
the reality stars. 117 Construction is at its height during post-production,
as editors splice and combine footage to create a dramatic storyline
108 Id. For a detailed discussion of the show, see Jeffrey Ruoff, “Can a Documentary Be Made
of Real Life?”, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIEWER: MEDIA ETHNOGRAPHY AND THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AUDIENCES 270–96 (Peter Ian Crawford & Sigurjón Baldur Hafsteinsson,
eds., 1996), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jruoff/Articles/RealLife.htm.
109 Margaret Mead, As Significant as the Invention of Drama or the Novel, TV GUIDE, Jan. 6,
1973, at A61–63.
110 Id.
111 Kelefa Sanneh, The Reality Principle, NEW YORKER, May 9, 2011, at 72.
112 Slocum, supra note 17.
113 Id.
114 “[I]n contemporary terms, reality television encompasses programs in which real people
are thrust into situations or given tasks and compete for a prize.” Podlas, supra note 80, at 145.
115 Id.
116 The large role of writers in the production of reality television shows led the Writers Guild
of America to strongly advocate for the inclusion of reality television show writers under their
union contracts, to insure that—among other things—the writers receive fair and accurate writing
credits for their work on the shows, and that their financial interests are protected. Reality &
Game Show Writers, WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, WEST, available at
http://www.wga.org/content/default.aspx?id=2630 (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
117 James Poniewozik, How Reality TV Fakes It, TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 29, 2006, at 60–62
(noting that Paris Hilton was fed lines by staff on her reality television show The Simple Life).
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from reams of mundane footage. 118
Over the years, criticism of the reality television industry has
grown—especially for mistreatment of show writers 119 and abusive
practices towards cast members, such as placing cast members in unsafe
and unhealthful environments for the sake of entertainment. 120 These
questionably exploitative practices include depriving participants of
sleep, placing participants at risk of seemingly imminent bodily harm,
or pressuring them to over-consume substances in order to push them to
the “edge” for the entertainment value of their subsequent behaviors.121
Generally, these shows avoid directly liability from show participants
by requiring that they sign lengthy waivers. 122
Despite criticism of the reality television industries’ exploitative
practices, 123 others find social and economic value in reality television.
Such economic value includes the high profit margin of reality
television shows—a result of the relatively low costs of casting and
production compared to scripted shows. 124 On the social side, scholars
118
119
120

Id.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
Criticism often revolves around shows placing participants in unsafe and unhealthful living
and working conditions. See Jeremy W. Peters, When Reality TV Gets Too Real, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2007, at C1; see also Jennifer L. Blair, Surviving Reality TV: The Ultimate Challenge for
Reality Show Contestants, 31 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 6–15 (2010). For arguments that
there should be greater protection for children who appear on reality television programs, see
Dayna B. Royal, Jon & Kate Plus the State: Why Congress Should Protect Children in Reality
Programming, 43 AKRON L. REV. 435 (2010); Katherine Neifeld, Note, A Minor Inconvenience:
The Case for Heightened Protection for Children Appearing on Reality Television, 32 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 447 (2010). Reality television shows have also been accused of violating
federal rigging laws and defrauding the contestants and the general public. For a discussion of the
various lawsuits and an argument for FCC regulation of reality television shows, see Tara
Brenner, Note, A “Quizzical” Look Into The Need For Reality Television Show Regulation, 22
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 873 (2005). For a discussion of whether reality television producers’
'interference with the “reality” of the show is a violation of the “Quiz Show Statute,” 47 U.S.C.
§509, see Podlas, supra note 80.
121 Edward Wyatt, TV Contestants: Tired, Tipsy and Pushed to the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2009, at A1. See also Blair, supra note 120 (examining the legal ramifications of the mental toll
reality television takes on its participants; noting that contracts and waivers are used to insulate
producers from liability, that reality show participants are not treated as employees, and,
therefore, participation in a show does not give rise to an employer-employee relationship for
liability).
122 For a contract from CBS’s reality television show Survivor, see Andy Dehnart, Survivor
contestant contract: the waivers, agreements that cast members, families sign, REALITY BLURRED
(May 31, 2010, 7:00pm), http://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/archives/survivor/2010_May_
31_contestant_agreements. See also Blair, supra note 120, at 18–25.
123 Reality dating shows are also criticized by feminist scholars, who argue that these shows
resurrect social biases and stereotypes. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. POZNER, REALITY BITES BACK:
THE TROUBLING TRUTH ABOUT GUILTY PLEASURE TV (2010). “Reality TV isn’t simply
reflecting anachronistic social biases, it’s resurrecting them. This genre has done what most
ardent fundamentalists have never been able to achieve: They’ve created a universe in which
women not only have no real choices, they don’t even want any.” Id. at 25.
124 See supra note 80 and accompanying text; infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also
Michelle Conlin, America’s Reality-TV Addiction, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 29, 2003,
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note that part of the “thrill” of watching reality television is the
possibility that the ordinary viewer too could be catapulted to national
fame. 125 This fantasy may also serve as a form of revenge, 126 allowing
the general public to recover from the “slight” of being cast as outsiders
from Hollywood society. 127 Some cultural theorists have gone so far as
to argue that reality television is an essential part of the democratic
process because it “teaches viewers to monitor, motivate, improve,
transform, and protect themselves in the name of freedom, enterprise,
and personal responsibility.” 128 In this sense, reality television serves
both informative and educational purposes; it supplies viewers with
information and then empowers them to sift through and select what to
take away from a program. The democratic potential of reality
television may also include the promise to grant ordinary people with
access to media and symbolic participation in the production of goods
and services. 129 Yet, this potential democratic power of access is also
criticized for functioning as an exploitative offer that entices normal
people to sell their life stories for the ultimate financial benefit of the
show producers. 130
Reality television also normalizes and idealizes the notion of
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2003-01-29/americas-reality-tv-addiction.
125 Steven Reiss et al., Why America Loves Reality TV, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept.–Oct.
2001, at 52 (“The message of reality television is that ordinary people can become so important
that millions will watch them. And the secret thrill of many of those viewers is the thought that
perhaps next time, the new celebrities might be them.”).
126 In the psychoanalytic sense, revenge often operates within the individual as a form of
fantasy, whereby the individual uses the revenge fantasy to unconsciously work through feelings
of jealously, anger, and envy. MARY SHERRILL DURHAM, THE THERAPIST’S ENCOUNTERS WITH
REVENGE AND FORGIVENESS 8–9 (2000) (discussing Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein’s
important work on revenge fantasies).
127 Conlin, supra note 124 (“By vaulting nobodies into overnight celebrities, these shows
appeal to the flip side of American’s fascination with stardom: people’s secret resentment at
being shut out of Hollywood’s second-carat system. Reality TV is revenge for the regular Jane
and Joe.”).
128 Product
Description: Better Living Through Reality TV, AMAZON.COM,
http://www.amazon.com/Better-Living-through-Realityebook/dp/B002M78KXS/ref=dp_kinw_
strp_1 (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). See LAURIE OUELLETTE ET AL., BETTER LIVING THROUGH
REALITY TV 1–31 (2008). Presumably the authors’ position is directed more toward the game
show and competition formats than the surveillance show format of reality television.
129 MARK ANDREJEVIC, REALITY TV: THE WORK OF BEING WATCHED 2–3, 6 (2004).
130

Reality TV . . . offers a . . . cynical version of democratization, one whereby producers
can deploy the offer of participation as a means of enticing viewers to share in the
production of a relatively inexpensive and profitable entertainment product. In this
respect, reality TV anticipates the exploitation of what this book describes as the work
of being watched, a form of production wherein consumers are invited to sell access to
their personal lives in a way not dissimilar to that in which they sell their labor
power . . . . [W]e find ourselves caught between the promise of an empowering form of
interactivity and the potential of an increasingly exploitative one.
Id. at 6–7.
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perpetual surveillance 131—a controversial concept that may have
positive and negative results for society. On the positive end, perpetual
surveillance provides advertisers and producers with unique data that
makes the production of individualized goods, services, and
advertisements possible. On the negative end, perpetual surveillance is
in effect the formal end to privacy.
E. Who Are These People?
Reality television stars are individuals who participate in reality
television programs. By participating in these shows, reality stars
publicize their personalities and consent to some level of invasion in
their private lives in a manner that other celebrities often do not. 132 Yet
the “bird’s eye view” presentation of the lives of “ordinary people” on
reality shows is often little more than an illusion. 133 Due to sophisticated
production techniques, as well as the participant’s own exaggerations,
the final product is much more a documentation of constructed personas
than snapshots into individuals’ private lives.
Incentives for participating in reality television shows vary. For
previously unknown individuals, reality television serves as a platform
to capture the public’s attention; 134 it can be quite lucrative as well.135
131
132

Id. at 2–7.
Jennifer R. Scharf, Shooting for the Stars: A Call for Federal Legislation to Protect
Celebrities’ Privacy Rights, 3 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 164, 168 (2005).
133 While this applies to some extent to all reality television show formats, it is most applicable
to the surveillance style shows, as well as those that involve character interviews. The authorship
of each act or statement of a reality show participant is debatable. An act or statement may be the
natural behavior of the participant, a construction of that participant, or a performance of—or
response to—direction from the shows’ crew, writers, or producers. In some instances, it may
even be the reading of a scripted line. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
134 Reality television brings to life Andy Warhol’s statement that “in the future everyone will
be famous for fifteen minutes.” Gene Swenson, What is Pop Art?, ARTNEWS, Nov. 1963, at 60.
135 Libby Chase, How Much Does Reality TV Pay?, YOUNGMONEY.COM (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://finance.youngmoney.com/careers/how-much-does-reality-tv-pay/v
(noting
relatively
unknown reality television star participants can make up to $5,000/month, while known stars on
popular shows like MTV’s California-based reality television show The Hills can make as much
as $100,000/episode). In 2009, after the show was on-air for several seasons, salaries for The
Hills stars were reportedly as high as $125,000 per episode, totaling $2.5 million dollars per year.
Nicole LaPorte, Hills Salaries Exposed, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 27, 2009),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2009/09/27/these-hills-are-paved-in-gold.print.html. Yet,
during the first season of MTV’s Jersey Shore, the cast combined made only $25,000 for the
entire season. Brian Stelter, With New Stars, Reality Shows See Costs Rise, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2010, at B1. At one point TLC paid Jon and Kate Gosselin $22,500 per episode for their reality
television show Jon & Kate Plus 8. Id. In rare cases, performance on a reality television show
may lead to scripted acting opportunities on other shows. See Tracie Egan Morrissey, Snooki &
JWoww Get Dumbed Down and Scripted for Spin-Off, JEZEBEL (Jan. 26, 2011),
http://jezebel.com/5743880/snooki—jwoww-get-dumbed-down-and-scripted-for-spin+off. Rarely
however do these spin-off opportunities lead to successful acting careers. Tim Conroy, When
Reality
Stars
Attack . . . Scripted
Drama,
AOLTV.COM
(Nov.
6,
2009),
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While, for individuals with prior public statuses, performing on a reality
television program can provide an opportunity to revive a fading or
extinguished career in entertainment. 136
Reality television stars monetize their fame in different ways.
Some individuals participate in a show, but do not financially exploit
their newfound national prominence through endorsement and
advertising deals. 137 Others take advantage of the national prominence
by either entering endorsement and advertising deals—where they can
further exploit their personas as brand spokespersons—or, by using their
fame to promote personal business ventures.
One example of a star who functions as a brand ambassador, while
promoting her own business ventures along the way is Kim Kardashian,
a star and co-producer of the reality television show Keeping Up With
The Kardashians. 138 In 2011, Ms. Kardashian sued The Gap and Old
Navy for violating her right of publicity and privacy by featuring a
model who looked like her in a broadcast advertisement. 139 In her
complaint, Ms. Kardashian alleged that the gravitas of her injury was
damage to her ability to earn income from her product endorsement
ventures, which include various fashion and beauty products. 140
An example of a reality star who used her reality show fame to
draw attention to personal business ventures is Bethenny Frankel, star of
Bravo! reality shows including The Real Housewives of New York and
founder of the health brand Skinnygirl. Ms. Frankel recently sold her
Skinnygirl cocktail line to Fortune Brands’ Beam Global and stated that
she went on the Bravo! reality show exclusively to promote her

http://www.aoltv.com/2009/11/06/when-reality-tv-stars-attack-scripted -drama/.
136 See ANDREJEVIC, supra note 129, at 3 (“[R]ecently, faded celebrities are attempting to use
reality shows to launch a comeback, or at least to pay the bills.”); Jo Piazza, Celebenomics: Why
‘Dancing With the Stars’ Is Like a Federal Bailout for Hollywood Careers, POPEATER (Mar. 8,
2010), http://www.popeater.com/2010/03/08/celebenomics-why-dancing-with-the-stars-is-like-afederal-bai/; William Baldwin Helped Wife Chynna Phillips Get on ‘Dancing With The Stars’,
STARPULSE (Sept. 24, 2011), http://www.starpulse.com/news/index.php/2011/09/24/william_
baldwin_helped_wife_chynna_phi (quoting William Baldwin) (“20 years later, if you’re trying to
re-brand, re-franchise and make yourself relevant in the entertainment industry again, what better
way to do it than in front of 20-some-odd-million people every week?”).
137 Some may be satisfied with the salary and experience. ANDREJEVIC, supra note 129, at 145
(noting Big Brother participants valued the experience of being on the show over $50,000).
138 In 2010, the Kardashian family together made $65 million in endorsement deals and
commercial projects, while Jersey Shore’s Mike Sorrentino made $5 million in 2010 from his
endorsement deals. Id. For a discussion of the available endorsement opportunities, including
payment for product mentions on celebrities’ Twitter and Facebook pages, see Leah W. Feinman,
Note, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-Traditional Advertising: How the FTC Regulations Fail to
Keep Up With The Kardashians, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 98–117
(2011).
139 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Kardashian v. The Gap, Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv05960 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2011). The case settled on August 28, 2012.
140 Id. at 2–5.
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business. 141
F. What’s Different?
Generally, a celebrity is an individual who has achieved a level of
fame that garners media attention. 142 Broad categories of celebrities are
sports figures, politicians, and entertainers. 143 A celebrities’ fame exists
on multiple levels, which cultural theorist Richard Dyer broke down
into three main categories using the example of film stars:
A film star’s image is not just his or her films but the promotion of
those films and of the star through pin-ups, public appearances,
studio hand-outs and so on, as well as interviews, biographies and
coverage in the press of the star’s doings and “private” life. Further,
a star’s image is also what people say or write about him or her, as
critics or commentators, the way the image is used in other contexts
such as advertisements, novels, pop songs, and finally the way the
star can become part of the coinage of everyday speech. 144

One of the differences between reality television stars and
traditional celebrities is the greater level of access reality stars offer the
public into their private lives. As Dyer notes, traditional celebrities have
a divide between public image and private life. 145 Part of their allure is a
function of this public-private divide, which evokes in the viewer a
desire to know more about who the star “really is” in her private life.146
Reality television stars, in contrast, attract public attention specifically
because they invite the public in to observe what appears to be their
private lives and inner worlds. 147 In this sense, reality television stars
provide the public with an access that traditional celebrities often deny.
Psychologists and sociologists argue the popularity of reality television
and its stars is largely attributable to this grant of access to the

141 Leslie Bruce, How Bethenny Frankel used reality TV to earn $120 million, MSNBC.COM
(Apr. 21, 2011), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/42708868/ns/today-entertainment/t/howbethenny-frankel-used-reality-tv-earn-million/ (“I went on ‘Housewives’ single-handedly and
exclusively for business,’ Bravo star says.”).
142 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 4.2 (“Often, celebrity status is created and maintained by the
media. The news media generally are directed at the largest audience possible in order to
maximize circulation. Media stars or celebrities are usually those whom we see most often
mentioned in newspapers, magazines and on television. They usually fall into the category of
sports figures, politicians and entertainers. The nature of their professions keeps them constantly
in the public eye. Hence, they are the ones that most people intuitively think of as ‘celebrities.’”).
143 Id.
144 RICHARD DYER, HEAVENLY BODIES 2–3 (1986).
145 Id. at 9–11.
146 Id.
147 Scharf, supra note 132, at 167. Ellen Goodman, Like a Peeping Tom at a Strip Show,
NAT’L POST, July 8, 2000, at A17.
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“private.” 148
Another difference between traditional celebrities and reality stars
is the underlying reasons for the star’s fame. The basis of a traditional
celebrity’s fame is a cultivated talent or skill that is shared with the
public through performances. Her labor is the cultivation of the
underlying talent and the subsequent public performances, which are
expressly separate from the star’s private self. In contrast, a reality
television star’s fame is based on a public exploitation of her own
persona in media performances, where she invites the public viewer to
observe a filmed version of her allegedly private life. 149 The labor of the
reality star, then, is the sale of her privacy and the construction of the
persona she will perform on the show. 150 And, the reality television
star’s fame depends both on how well the public responds to that
construction and how the reality star fits into the overall show. 151
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH, AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
A. Overview
As the right of publicity expands in the United States, so too have
the critics. Scholars question the justifications behind the right of
publicity and criticize the right as “a massive exercise of question
begging.” 152 Courts have placed judicial limits on the right of publicity
and developed various tests in order to protect conflicting First
Amendment interests. 153 Judges warn that expansive state-based
publicity rights are on a collision course with federal copyright law.154
Practitioners criticize the inconsistency among state publicity laws and
call for uniform federal regulation or an abolition of the right of
publicity. 155 Recently, a broad choice of law provision in one state’s
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

See Steven Reiss et al., supra note 125.
See supra notes 15–17 and Part II.F.
ANDREJEVIC, supra note 129, at 1–13.
Supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text.
Coombe, supra note 75, at 368.
See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1285 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
155 See INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, DRAFT PUBLICITY RIGHTS LEGISLATION
(Proposal to Amend the Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Sept. 30, 1996) (draft withdrawn);
Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals to
Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998) (discussing lack of uniformity among state
right of publicity recognition and arguing for a national uniform right of publicity code); Richard
S. Robinson, Preemption, The Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 183 (1998); J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., Note, The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The Case
For a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1179–91 (1987) (discussing the problems of the
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right of publicity statute was even invalidated as an unconstitutional
violation of the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause. 156 Meanwhile, the expansion of the
right of publicity is tied to private interest groups, who have much to
gain from expansive, descendible publicity rights. 157
The basis for the right of publicity—as a product of the twentieth
century, owing much of its growth and expansion to the efforts of
private lobbyists—is often called into question by these critics. 158 Yet,
the application of broad publicity rights for reality stars is even more
questionable. Broad publicity rights for reality television stars are
particularly problematic because the line between a reality star’s
identity and constructed persona or character is unclear—what is
presented as self is often a construction. 159 The right of publicity only
grants protection over identity; characters and constructed personas are
protected by federal copyright law, which expressly preempts
overlapping state laws. 160 Thus, the application of broad publicity
protection for reality television stars risks impermissible intrusion into
the domain of federal copyright law by protecting what in effect is the
reality star’s constructed persona or character. Furthermore, the
justifications for the right of publicity fall short when applied to reality
television stars. An examination of these issues makes clear that the
courts have a special duty to carve out space in right of publicity law for
a fair use exception to allow the public access to reference and represent reality television stars’ constructed personas.

state-based right of publicity regime in terms of fairness to the parties, impact on incentives for
famous people to create new works, tension with federal copyright law, and unfairness to
individuals who chose to not commercialize their identities while alive); BLACK, supra note 8, at
105 (“The current . . . US approach[] . . . [relies] on a wide range of state legislation, case law,
federal jurisprudence, tort and unfair competition restatements—are certainly not an ideal
coherent whole. The protection for publicity rights in the United States is not necessarily to be
envied or emulated.”).
156 Experience Hendrix, LLC v. Hendrixlicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1138–43
(W.D. Wash. 2011) (invalidating “Property right—Use of name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness,” WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.010 (2008)). The Washington statute was previously
amended to create a broad choice of law forum in response to Experience Hendrix LLC v. James
Marshall Hendrix Foundation, 240 Fed. Appx. 739 (9th Cir. 2007), where the court applied New
York law to determine that Hendrix’s publicity rights extinguished at death. See Wash. S.
Judiciary Comm. Rep., H.B. 2727, 60th Leg., 2d Sess. (Feb. 29, 2008).
157 See supra notes 53, 71. Michael Gormley, Bill Pushed by Pacino, Ono, Others Would
Protect Dead Celebrities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 11, 2007. To get a sense of the amount of
money at stake for dead celebrities’ estates, see Forbes’ annual list The Top-Earning Dead
Celebrities, FORBES, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/22/top-earning-deadcelebrities-business-entertainment-dead-celebs-10_land.html?boxes=listschannelinsidelists
(listing Michael Jackson in first place with $275 million in gross earnings for the year).
158 See supra notes 75–79, 152–157 and accompanying texts.
159 See supra notes 14–17 and Parts II.E–F.
160 See supra note 28 and infra note 163.
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B. Copyright Preemption and the Identity-Character Divide
Generally, a talent-based celebrity’s ability to sue for a violation of
the right of publicity is limited to the appropriation of her own identity,
as ownership rights for characters and performances often belong to
someone other than the star. An actor, for example, may not have
grounds to sue for the appropriation of a character she played, as the
copyright in the character and story line usually belongs to the writer or
producer. 161 Likewise, athletes do not own the copyrights to their
performances on broadcast television, and, under industry standards,
they are required by contract to transfer image and performance rights
to their team and league. 162
Broad publicity rights for reality television stars are problematic
because, while these stars appear as “themselves” on reality television
shows, the broadcasted personas are much closer to constructed
characters. The line between character and identity is particularly
important because the right of publicity protects identities, not
characters; claims based on the appropriation of a character or
performance are generally preempted by federal copyright law. 163 In
fact, courts already have trouble distinguishing between a character and
161 See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (right of publicity
claims turning on whether robot characters resembled actors’ likenesses, as the actors did not
have claim over the identifiable outfits worn by the robots because the outfits identified the
television show characters, and not the actors’ personas).
162 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding that the telecasts of the baseball players’ performances were owned by the baseball
clubs and thus holding that the baseball players’ right of publicity claims over the telecasts of
their images were preempted under Section 301 of the Copyright Act).
163 Copyright protects creative expression fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102 (2012). The Copyright Act preempts equivalent common law and statutory rights. 17
U.S.C. § 301 (2012). State-based right of publicity “[c]laims are not preempted by the federal
copyright statute so long as they contain elements, such as the invasion of personal rights . . . that
are different in kind from copyright infringement.” Wendt v. Host, Nos. 93-56318, 93-56510,
1995 WL 115571, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 1995) (omission in original) (internal citations
omitted). See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 289 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982); Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F.
Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 850 (1979)
(Bird, C.J., dissenting). However, the fact that the Copyright Act does not expressly preempt the
right of publicity does not mean that the right of publicity and copyright law are never in conflict.
For example, when a creator uses an image of an individual without that individual’s consent,
then the right of publicity may in effect destroy the creator’s exclusive rights under Section 106
of the Copyright Act. See Salomon, Jr., supra note 155, at 1188; Marc J. Anfelbaum, Note,
Copyright and the Right of Publicity: One Pea in Two Pods?, 71 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1580 (1983);
see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the automobile
company and advertising agency violated the singer’s right of publicity by using a sound-alike in
a commercial that included plaintiff-singer’s song, and finding that by using a sound-alike the
defendants had improperly appropriated the singer’s identity—namely her distinctive voice—
without her consent, even though the defendants secured a license with the copyright owner to
legally perform the song).
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an identity when dealing with certain right of publicity claims brought
by traditional celebrities. 164 The difficulty only grows in the context of
reality television stars, who are famous, in large part, for blurring the
lines between public and private, and between character and identity.
Furthermore, current jurisprudence is in conflict over the threshold
level of identity that must be appropriated in order for a violation of the
right of publicity to occur. 165 For example, in New York, the right of
publicity does not extend to constructed personas or characters, but may
cover certain signifiers, if those features are found to remind the viewer
of an individual’s identity, as opposed to merely a character or persona
the individual constructed or performed. 166 While the New York
approach may reflect a reasonable effort to cabin right of publicity
claims, the rule provides little guidance as to how courts should discern
identity or identifiable features from constructed personas and
characters.
California has attempted to avoid this line drawing by broadly
construing the common law definition of identity to cover anything that
reminds the viewer of an individual, even if the reference only borrows
an element from a copyrighted performance.167 However, California’s
broad construction of identity has evoked sharp dissents, as well as
criticism from scholars who claim that broad definitions of identity
violate the First Amendment and place the right of publicity on a
collision course with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution. 168
164 This issue has split the Ninth Circuit on several occasions. See White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (dissenting from the denial of
rehearing en banc and disagreeing with the panel’s finding that a robot with a wig standing in
front of a Wheel of Fortune game board reminded viewers of Vanna White and therefore violated
her common law right of publicity); Wendt v. Host Int’l Inc., 197 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). For a discussion of the limits of an
actor’s ability to claim a violation of the right of publicity when the defendant appropriated
aspects of the character they performed, see Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824–26
(1979) (Mosk, J., concurring) (“Bela Lugosi did not portray himself and did not create Dracula,
he merely acted out a popular role that had been garnished with the patina of age, as had
innumerable other thespians over the decades. His performance gave him no more claim on
Dracula than that of countless actors on Hamlet who have portrayed the Dane in a unique
manner.”).
165 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
166 Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[The New York statute]
does not extend to fictitious characters adopted or created by celebrities.”).
167 For an example, see White, 971 F.2d 1395.
168 See, e.g., White, 989 F.2d at 1514 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) (“The panel’s opinion is a classic case of overprotection. Concerned about what it sees as a
wrong done to Vanna White, the panel majority erects a property right of remarkable and
dangerous breadth: Under the majority’s opinion, it’s now a tort for advertisers to remind the
public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity’s name, voice, signature or likeness; not to imply the
celebrity endorses a product; but simply to evoke the celebrity’s image in the public’s mind. This
Orwellian notion withdraws far more from the public domain than prudence and common sense
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As reality television shows grow more manufactured, and as
production teams become more involved in participants’ character
construction, 169 the line between identity and character will be even
more important for courts to determine in reality television star right of
publicity cases. Yet, the line between what evokes a reality television
star’s true identity and what merely references elements of a constructed
character that appears within the storyline of a copyrightable reality
television episode remains far from clear. 170 Broad publicity rights for
reality television stars leave courts with the burdensome task of drawing
lines within the murky spectrum of references that appropriate the
reality television star’s actual identity versus those that merely reference
a constructed character (protected by federal copyright law), or some
generic element of a character that even copyright law does not
protect. 171
Meanwhile, the growth of the reality television industry has also
sparked copyright litigation between networks and production
companies over claimed infringement of entire shows. 172 In these cases,
courts apply the substantial similarity test to determine whether
infringement occurred. 173 Notably, one of the elements that the courts
allow. It conflicts with the Copyright Act and the Copyright Clause. It raises serious First
Amendment problems. It’s bad law, and it deserves a long, hard second look.”).
169

Reality TV formats have multiplied to the point that they have become self-conscious
parodies of their original premise of access to the unscripted interactions of people who
are not professional entertainers . . . . Rather, reality shows are becoming the latest and
most self-conscious in a string of transparently staged spectacles, complete with their
own formulas and increasingly reliant on a cast of demicelebrities culled from the pool
of would-be actors who do the rounds of reality TV casting calls on the advice of
agents.
ANDREJEVIC, supra note 129, at 3.
170 See generally J. Ryan Stradal, Unscripted does not mean Unwritten, WRITERS GUILD OF
AMERICA, WEST, available at http://www.wga.org/organizesub.aspx?id=1096 (last visited Aug.
25, 2013) (“Unscripted storytelling is often about working backwards from the ending in the most
interesting way possible, crafting an inevitable occurrence into an emotional, humorous, or
provocative journey. Often, we also write the voice-over copy for our episodes, which for you
old-timey bulwarks who don’t consider the narrative construction of unscripted or documentary
work ‘writing,’ certainly qualifies as such . . . . Reality certainly does not write itself.”).
171 See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
172 For a review of the cases, see Daniel Fox, Harsh Realities: Substantial Similarity in the
Reality Television Context, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 223 (2006); J. Matthew Sharp, Note, Reality
Television: Understanding the Unique Nature of the Reality Genre in Copyright Infringement
Cases, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 177, 186–93 (2005). Contra Jessica E. Bergman, No More
Format Disputes: Are Reality Television Formats the Proper Subject of Federal Copyright
Protection?, 4 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 243 (2011) (discussing the recent cases and
arguing that copyright law should not protect reality television show formats).
173 Mindy Farabee, Can Reality Be Copyrighted?, L.A. DAILY J., June 24, 2009 (noting the
2003 case CBS Broad. Inc., v. ABC, Inc. established that reality television is copyrightable and
that the substantial similarity test is applied to compare reality television shows in order to
determine copyright infringement).
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compare is the similarity between the show’s reality television stars,
who are referred to by the courts in this context as “characters.” 174 The
treatment of reality television stars as characters in copyright
infringement cases is in direct odds with their representation as
individuals in right of publicity cases. This transmutable treatment of
the reality television star is problematic for the courts, creates
uncertainty for the public, and provides the reality television industry as
a whole with two bites of the apple. To resolve these tensions, and in
light of the multi-layered construction of characters depicted on reality
television shows, the right of publicity should be narrowed.
C. Justifications for the Right of Publicity and their Failure to Justify
Broad Publicity Rights for Reality Television Stars
The justifications for the right of publicity generally fall into three
categories: moral rights, economic incentive, and consumer
protection. 175 The failure of these justifications to explain reality
television stars’ publicity rights further demonstrates why a fair use test
is needed.
1. Moral Rights Justification
The moral rights justification is based on the notion that
individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labor. 176 The reasoning
behind this justification is two-fold. First, the rationale relies on a theory
of labor 177 that assumes an individual with a commercially valuable
identity has cultivated a talent and expended considerable energy in

174 CBS Broad. Inc., v. ABC, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 8813, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20258, at *32,
30–39 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 13, 2003) (defining the stars as characters because they are “real people
playing themselves”); Zella v. EW Scripps Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2007);
Castorina v. Spike Cable Networks, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
175 See Madow, supra note 29, at 178–238 (criticizing these justifications); Stacey L. Dogan et
al., What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1180
(2006) (listing the justifications as “the moral or natural rights story; the exhaustion or allocativeefficiency account; and the incentive-based rationale”). “The right is thought to further economic
goals such as stimulating athletic and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of
resources, and protecting consumers. In addition, the right of publicity is said to protect various
noneconomic interests, such as safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of celebrity labors,
preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional harm.” Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973 (10th Cir. 1996).
176 See Nimmer, supra note 21, at 216; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977); McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 918–22 (3d Cir. 1994); Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. 1967).
177 See generally J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 25–36 (L. DeKoster
ed., 1978) (discussing labor theory).
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order to achieve that level of fame. 178 Due to this labor, the individual
deserves the reward of the exclusive right to commercially exploit her
identity. Second, the exclusive right of publicity must vest in the
individual in order to prevent the unjust enrichment of others, who seek
to free-ride off the famous individual’s identity and commercially
benefit from her cultivated fame. 179
Yet, this theory of labor is based on a romantic notion of fame and
authorship; 180 it fails to account for the fact that cultivation of talent and
the creation of fame are not solitary activities in modern society. 181
Rather, the development of a successful celebrity persona is dependent
on the labor of others—including talent coaches, stylists, agents,
marketing teams, directors, business managers, and legal advisors—who
all contribute in valuable ways to the star’s resulting fame and
professional success. 182 Given the extensive amount of outside labor
that is involved in the construction of a star’s persona and the
development of the star’s career, a reward for the fruits of one’s labor
theory provides an unsatisfactory explanation for why the law should
grant celebrities with exclusive rights over the commercialization of
their identities. 183 In fact, under a labor justification alone, broad
publicity rights could amount to unjust enrichment by providing
celebrities with the fruits of other people’s labor, on top of their own.184
Some courts have acknowledged the weakness of the labor justification
by noting that the more involved an industry is with the development of
the celebrity’s fame, the less deserving the celebrity is of the right of
178 “[Y]ears of labor may be required before one’s skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues of
sufficiently developed to permit an economic return through some medium of commercial
promotion.” Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804–05 (Cal. 2001).
179 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576; Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 840 (1979) (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting); K.J. GREENE, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. 29016, 282, 283 (Mar. 2011).
180 “[T]he ‘moral’ case for the right of publicity seems a bit quaint. It is tied, normatively and
conceptually, to a picture of individual creation and originality, and of self-authorship as well,
that was always to some degree mythical, but that new technologies of reproduction (from
photography to digital sampling) and new aesthetic practices have rendered otiose.” Madow,
supra note 29, at 198.
181 See Coombe, supra note 75, at 369–70 (“Star images must be made, and, like other cultural
products, their creation occurs in social contexts and draws upon other resources, institutions, and
technologies. Star images are authored by studios, the mass media, public relations agencies, fan
clubs, gossip columnists, photographers, hairdressers, body-building coaches, athletic trainers,
teachers, screenwriters, ghostwriters, directors, lawyers, and doctors. Even if we only consider the
production and dissemination of the star image, and see its value as solely the result of human
labor, this value cannot be entirely attributed to the efforts of a single author.”).
182 Id.
183 Edwin Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 37 (1989)
(“[A]ssuming that labor’s fruits are valuable, and that laboring gives the laborer a property right
in this value, this would entitle the laborer only to the value she added, and not to the total value
of the resulting product.”).
184 See id.; Madow, supra note 29, at 183–205.
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publicity. 185
The moral rights justification is also problematic because the
notion that the right of publicity is necessary to prevent the unjust
enrichment of free-riders overlooks the fact that the legal recognition of
exclusive, transferable publicity rights is part of what establishes the
high market value of the commercial use of identity. 186 This justification
is based on the incorrect assumption that the market for the commercial
use of celebrities’ personas has always existed. In fact, until the midtwentieth century—when the right of publicity was created—the
unauthorized commercial use of celebrities’ personas was actually quite
common. 187 Scholars reviewing this history criticize the circular logic of
the unjust enrichment justification as “a massive exercise in questionbegging.” 188
Furthermore, under a network effects analysis, the value of a
celebrity’s identity exists in large part because the public recognizes the
persona. 189 The public’s recognition of the star is what creates space for
the celebrity to develop a secondary meaning within society. This
secondary meaning transforms the individual into a recognized
celebrity, and it is precisely what makes the star’s identity commercially
valuable and licensable. 190 Ironically, by granting the exclusive right of
185 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir.
1996) (“Celebrities, however, are often not fully responsible for their fame. Indeed, in the
entertainment industry, a celebrity’s fame may largely be the creation of the media or the
audience . . . . Professional athletes may be more responsible for their celebrity status, however,
because athletic success is fairly straightforwardly the result of an athlete’s natural talent and
dedication. Thus, baseball players may deserve to profit from the commercial value of their
identities more than movie stars.”).
186 Cf. Madow, supra note 69, at 353 (“The mere fact that immense ‘publicity values’ attach to
celebrity personas, however, is not reason enough to grant celebrities a property right in them. To
be sure, advertisers, merchandisers, and the media will pay celebrities for the use of these values
if the law requires them to do so. But the question that needs to be answered is whether the law
ought to require them to pay—specifically, whether a property right in identity should be
recognized.”).
187 Madow, supra note 29, at 148–78.
188 Coombe, supra note 75, at 368 (“Celebrities, then, have an interest in policing the use of
their personas to insure that they do not become tainted with associations that would prematurely
tarnish the patina they might license to diverse enterprises. This potential commercial value is
generally offered as reason in itself to protect the star’s control over his identity through the
allocation of exclusive property rights; because such interests have market value, they deserve
protection. Others, like myself, see this as ‘a massive exercise in question-begging.’ Market
values arise only after property rights have been established and enforced; the decision to allocate
particular property rights is a prior question of social policy that requires philosophical and moral
deliberations and a consideration of social costs and benefits.”).
189 See de Grandpré, supra note 27, at 106 (“What makes celebrities’ likeness valuable . . . is
the meaning associated with their persona, their power to evoke positive ideas and feelings from
an audience.”); DYER, supra note 144, at 2–20 (demonstrating that value and meaning are created
not only by the producer, by also by the consumer and the audience, who create demand and
value for the celebrity’s image).
190 The public’s role in the value of star’s persona points to one reason why the right of
publicity should be limited to leave room for the public’s access, as “the power to license is the
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publicity to the star, the law vests the star with the power to silence the
very public whose recognition establishes that star’s fame. 191
Under a labor justification, reality television stars as a class are the
least deserving of the right of publicity due to the heavy involvement of
the reality television industry in the creation of reality stars’ fame and
the construction of their personas. 192 As previously discussed, the
authorship of a reality television star’s identity is a complicated web—
the final broadcasted product is the result of efforts by numerous
individuals and institutions. 193 The reality television star’s fame depends
on the production company’s decision to cast the star, the quality and
appeal of the show concept, the writer’s development of the episode
plotlines, the editing team’s construction of the personality within the
show storyline, as well as the network’s marketing efforts and decision
to actually broadcast the show. 194
While talent-based celebrities’ careers may also be affected by the
decisions of the networks or managers, their fame is not wholly
dependent on these decisions because their success also depends on the
quality of their underlying cultivated talents. Of course, performing on a
reality television show is not a wholly laborless task. The point is
simply that the reality television star’s labor of promoting persona in
order to exploit her personality 195 is distinguishable from the promotion
of persona in order to share a cultivated talent or skill with the public.196
This difference may be reason to legally differentiate reality television
stars’ right of publicity claims from the claims of other celebrities.
2. Economic Incentive Justification
The economic incentive justification for the right of publicity is
often analogized to the rationale behind copyright protection, because
the right of publicity also involves a barter between the celebrity and the
public. 197 In this barter, the public grants the celebrity with exclusive
publicity rights as an economic incentive to cultivate talent and produce
power to suppress.” Madow, supra note 29, at 135.
191 See id. at 128, 135.
192 See supra Parts II.A, II.D–F.
193 See id.
194 See supra Part II.D.
195 See, e.g., Kim Kardashian’s ‘wedding staged’ says her ex-publicist, N.Y. POST, Nov. 9,
2011,
http://www.nypost.com/p/pagesix/kim_kardashian_wedding_staged_says_
9wn0dhXx3T8PphlfXhyfOI.
196 T.L. Stanley, The situation for reality TV stars? Money, honey, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/18/entertainment/la-et-reality-shills-20111019 (“After all,
some [reality stars] are famous only for their inability to self-censor. It doesn’t matter that some
of the stars have no discernible skills other than shameless self-promotion.”).
197 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576–77 (1977); Comedy III Prods.,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805–09 (Cal. 2001).
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new work. 198
Yet, the economic incentive justification for the right of publicity
has been criticized as erroneous because, unlike copyright—which
incentives less economically secure career paths like visual arts and
writing—the grant of exclusive publicity rights rarely functions to
encourage entertainers to develop their careers. 199 For example,
successful actors, musicians, and athletes are already well compensated
for their professional performances and work product. While the right of
publicity may enable stars to control the commercialization of their
celebrity “brand,” and thus secure additional compensation through
merchandising, advertising, and endorsement deals, it is doubtful that
the loss of this additional compensation would actually create a
disincentive to cultivate talent and seek fame in the first place. 200
Concededly, the possibility of gaining wealth through advertising
deals and endorsement opportunities may be a motivating factor for
some individuals to participate in reality television shows. 201 Yet, even
without broad publicity rights, reality television stars’ interests in these
endorsement opportunities are already protected under Section 1125(a)
of the Lanham Act.202 A Lanham Act claim may even be an easier case
for reality star plaintiffs because, unlike the state-based right of
publicity, a Lanham Act claim is actionable under the same standard
(and subject to the same defenses) in every jurisdiction. 203
The Lanham Act however, will only protect reality television stars
against deceptive unauthorized uses of their personas; unauthorized
commercial uses that fail to mislead or deceive go untouched. It is
possible then, that a limitation on reality television stars’ publicity rights
would create a disincentive to perform on reality television shows. 204 As
a society, though, we may for policy reasons want to disincentivize such
198
199

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 577.
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 846–48 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (“The incentive effect of publicity rights, however, has been overstated. Most
sports and entertainment celebrities with commercially valuable identities engage in activities that
themselves generate a significant amount of income; the commercial value of their identities is
merely a by-product of their performance values.”); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 973–74 (10th Cir. 1996).
200 Madow, supra note 29, at 209–10.
201 Stanley, supra note 196 (“If you’re part of a reality TV show and might be famous for 15
minutes, tops, it’s probably best to cash in while you can. But what if you’re not a breakout star
on the Kim Kardashian level? No worries. Blue-chip national advertisers, nightclub promoters
and book publishers still want you. And they’re willing to fork over real money—sometimes six
figures and up—for your recognizable face.”).
202 See supra Part II.C.
203 See supra Parts I.E., II.C.
204 “Collectively referred to as the ‘right of publicity,’ the ability to exploit one’s image has
become an increasingly valuable commodity, often eclipsing the value of the celebrity’s principal
occupation. Indeed, for today’s reality stars—many of whose fame is rooted in no particular skill
set per se, but who are ‘famous for being famous’—it is the only commodity.” Leichtman et al.,
supra note 15.

Korotkin_ES Edit LK review post macro 10 3 2013 re macro and accepted all v3-1 (Do Not Delete)10/16/2013 8:59 AM

2013

FINDING REALITY IN THE R I G H T O F P U B L I C I TY

303

behavior. A paternalistic reason might be to protect potential reality
television participants from the industry’s exploitative business
practices, unhealthful working environments, and mandatory “bulletproof” participant waivers. 205 If limiting publicity rights for reality
television star participants results in reduced advertising and
merchandising opportunities for the show participants, then it may help
ensure that the financial fruits of a catapult into national fame do not
blind individuals from properly considering the risks of participation in
reality television shows. 206 Such a deterrent force may also benefit
society by disincentivizing the exploitation of persona and incentivizing
the cultivation of a talent or skill. 207
3. Consumer Protection Justification
The third justification for the right of publicity is closer to
trademark law’s goal to protect the consumer from confusion as to the
source or endorsement of a product. 208 This justification is strongest in
cases where a celebrity’s identity is used to advertise a product. For
example, in 1991 Public Enemy rapper Chuck D sued the makers of St.
Ides “40-ounce” malt liquor for five million dollars for violating his
right of publicity when they produced advertisements that used the
rapper’s voice to promote their product without his consent. 209 Chuck D
was vocally against the sales of high-alcohol content malt liquor
beverages in inner-city areas. 210 Therefore, the appropriation of Chuck
D’s voice in a St. Ides commercial harmed him by confusing consumers
as to his endorsement of and connection with St. Ides—using Chuck D’s
voice to promote a product he was publicly against harmed the artist by
making him appear to be a hypocrite and “sell-out.” 211

205
206
207

See supra notes 119–123, 130 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119–123, 130–131 and accompanying text.
Assuming, of course, that society benefits more from the production and consumption of
cultivated talents, than from the production and consumption of exploited personas.
208 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2006).
209 Peter Kobel, Chuck D: ‘This One’s Not for You’, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY, Sept. 27,
1991. For a general discussion of the St. Ides advertising campaign and criticism of it for
confusing consumers as to whether they were watching ads or music videos, see Charne Graham,
St. Ides & Hip-Hop: Would Today’s Rappers Endorse Malt Liquor?, HOUSTON PRESS (Oct 24,
2011), http://blogs.houstonpress.com/rocks/2011/10/st_ides_and_hip-hop_would_toda.php.
210 GEORGE NELSON, HIP HOP AMERICA 211 (1998).
211 For a personal account of the case, see GREENE, supra note 179, at 289–90 (“[T]his was a
case where an artist’s personal integrity—an aspect of personality and, autonomy—had been
appropriated. Even assuming Chuck D could not show consumer confusion, the law should give
some protection against such uses.”). In addition to the lawsuit, Chuck D also responded by
writing 1 Million Bottlebags, a “diss-rap” and critique of 40-ounce malt liquor consumption. The
lyrics
are
available
at
1
Million
Bottlebags,
PUBLICENEMY,
http://www.publicenemy.com/album/4/97/1-million-bottlebags.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
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As the Chuck D-St. Ides dispute illuminates, the violation of a
celebrity’s right of publicity in the advertisement-endorsement context
can create real damage, especially if the individual’s identity is used to
endorse harmful or dangerous goods. Such a violation may cause harm
to both the celebrity—who suffers reputational damage—as well as the
public, which improperly trusts the product as a result of the false
endorsement. 212 However, when right of publicity violations involve a
false endorsement, the individual already has a cause of action under the
Lanham Act and some state unfair competition laws, as well as
defamation law if reputational injury occurs. 213 For the same reasons
discussed in regards to the economic justification, limiting reality
television stars’ access to publicity law may be fair in light of the
protection they will continue to receive under the Lanham Act and
various state unfair competition and defamation laws.
IV. DEFENSES AND OTHER INTERESTS
A. The First Amendment Defense and the Public’s Interest in Accessing
Celebrities’ Identities for Communicative and Commentary Purposes
Federal law is often implicated in right of publicity cases as a First
Amendment defense. 214 The First Amendment generally protects the
public from government abridgement of the freedoms of speech and
expression. 215 The First Amendment is implicated in right of publicity
cases between private parties because when states and courts recognize
and enforce the right of publicity, they effectively impose restrictions on
private parties’ rights to the freedoms of speech and expression. 216
212 Madow, supra note 29, at 231–34; see also Randall T.E. Coyne, Towards a Modified Fair
Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 799 (1988).
213 See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir.
1996) (“The final economic argument offered for rights of publicity is that they protect against
consumer deception . . . . The Lanham Act, however, already provides nationwide protection
against false or misleading representations in connection with the sale of products.”). A cause of
action may also stand under unfair competition law. See, e.g., Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 114
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314, 316 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1957) (“We conclude, therefore, that defendant has
misappropriated plaintiff’s ‘right of publicity’, but that this is simply an application of the
doctrine of unfair competition to a property right entitled ‘right of publicity’. This, therefore, is
not a separate cause of action, but rather is unfair competition under another label.”).
214 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1977); Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2010); Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959, 962; Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 n.12 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Appellee concedes that NCAA Football
infringes on the right of publicity as recognized in New Jersey . . . therefore . . . we are concerned
only with whether the right to freedom of expression overpowers the right of publicity.”);
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865–76 (1979).
215 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
216 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 968; Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an
Independent Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 867
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Celebrities serve as reference points for millions of people around
the world; they are part of a shared experience and collective
memory. 217 Scholars including Michael Madow, Rosemary Coombe,
and David Tan have argued for greater First Amendment protection to
appropriate and reference celebrities’ identities. 218 Noting that
celebrities hold secondary meaning in our society and are part of our
collective cultural heritage, these scholars argue that the public should
have broad license to access, reference, and “re-code” celebrities as
“signs.” 219 In order to ensure this access, celebrities’ personas must
remain in the public domain, available for communicative uses by the
public without the threat of legal liability. 220 The consequences of
denying such access may be severe, as preserving minority groups’
ability to access and “re-code” celebrities’ images to fit their own
cultural needs is central to participatory democracy. 221 Under Tan’s
formulation, the use of celebrity images by minority groups to “re-code”
majority icons and create alternative narratives should be granted the
highest form of First Amendment protection as political speech. 222
Despite the public’s need for access, the enforcement of the right
of publicity can effectively grant a celebrity, her heirs, and assigns with
(1995) (“By its nature, the right of publicity implicates speech: whatever else it may be, the right
of publicity involves a communicative tort.”).
217 JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1991) (“[Celebrities are] common points of reference
for millions of individuals who may never interact with one another, but who share, by virtue of
their participation in a mediated culture, a common experience and a collective memory.”).
218 Coombe, supra note 75; Madow, supra note 29; Tan, supra note 75.
219 Recoding is defined as “a set of subcultural practices and activities in which ‘the
consumption of commodified representational forms is productive activity in which people
engage in meaning-making to adapt signs, texts, and images to their own agendas.’” Keith Aoki,
Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience “Recoding” Rights—Comment on Robert H.
Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work”, 68 CHI.KENT L. REV. 805, 810 (1993) (quoting Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of
Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1863
(1991)).
220 See generally Lange, supra note 66 (discussing the importance of a lively and
unencumbered public domain). Communicative uses may include both commercial and noncommercial uses. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
221 See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011) (arguing that the right to
participate in democratic self-governance is the core of freedom of speech). See also Tan, supra
note 75, at 7 (“This Article adopts the premise that the underlying rationale of the First
Amendment is the advancement of a democracy where the public can freely participate in
deliberating issues important to decision-making in a democracy (‘participatory democracy’).
This is a plausible and well-supported view of the First Amendment . . . . Part III argues that the
various tests formulated to give effect to First Amendment goals in right of publicity claims do
not accord sufficient protection to political speech because they do not adequately address how
uses of the celebrity identity may contribute to the advancement of democratic deliberation and
debate.”).
222 Tan, supra note 75, at 35–36. For a case study of minority groups’ appropriations of the
identities of Marilyn Monroe, Judy Garland, and Paul Robeson, see DYER, supra note 144, at 2–3.
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the power to silence any alternative appropriation or representation of
the celebrity’s image that does not fit the rights owner’s tastes or
politics. 223 Judges and scholars note this power to silence is a reason to
be wary of the right of publicity, 224 as strict enforcement of the right
places great restraint on the public domain. 225
B. The Current Landscape of First Amendment Defenses Falls Short
When the right of publicity conflicts with the First Amendment,
courts apply various tests to analyze the competing interests of the
rights holder and the public. These tests include the transformative use
test, the balancing test, the predominant purpose test, and the artistic
relevance test. While they all present valid attempts to limit publicity
law’s abridgment of the public’s First Amendment rights, these tests fall
short as both over- and under-inclusive. Furthermore, in the context of
reality television stars, these test fail to broadly protect the public’s
interest in commenting on the phenomenon of reality television star
fame and participating in the construction of meaning of reality
television and culture. 226
1. The Balancing Test
The balancing test was formulated by the Tenth Circuit in
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association to
balance the magnitude of the right of publicity’s restriction on speech
223 See supra notes 188–191 and accompanying text; Madow, supra note 29, at 142–43 (“[The
subtext of publicity rights] is control over the production and circulation of meaning in our
society. This is so because star images are widely used in contemporary American culture to
create and communicate meaning and identity. The fact that the culture and advertising industries
routinely and systematically use celebrity images in this way should be obvious enough. Indeed,
it is only because celebrity images carry and provoke meaning that they can enhance the
marketability of the commodities with which they are associated. Their ‘associative’ or
‘publicity’ value derives from their semiotic power. What is somewhat less obvious is that
individuals and groups also use star signs in their everyday lives to communicate meanings of
their own making.”).
224 Lange, supra note 66, at 153.
225 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The right to draw ideas from a rich and varied
public domain, and the right to mock, for profit as well as fun, the cultural icons of our time. In
the name of avoiding the ‘evisceration’ of a celebrity’s rights in her image, the majority
diminishes the rights of copyright holders and the public at large.”).
226 For example, these tests would grant very limited—if any—First Amendment defenses to
the appropriation of celebrities’ personas for unauthorized use or reference in advertisements.
Yet, “[t]o let celebrities control all uses of their ‘identity’ in advertising is to let them control the
way their image is presented in a very large realm of public communication and popular culture.”
Stephen R. Barnett, The Right of Publicity Versus Free Speech in Advertising; Some
Counterpoints to Professor McCarthy, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 598 (1996).
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against the government’s interest in protecting the right of publicity as
an intellectual property right. 227 Recognizing that “[o]ne of the primary
goals of intellectual property law is to maximize creative expression,”
this test generally provides greater First Amendment protection to
creative works, like parodies, that involve self-expression or social
criticism. 228 Yet, some courts criticize the Cardtoons court’s heavy
emphasis on the social importance of parody as depending too much on
the expressive nature of the use, while failing to analyze the amount and
type of appropriation that occurred. 229 Others praise the court’s nuanced
approach, 230 but acknowledge the burden that a balancing test places on
courts and the unpredictability that it creates for potential litigants. 231
2. The Transformative Use Test
The California courts, finding that the Cardtoons balancing test
overemphasizes the social benefits of a defendant’s use, instead
formulated a transformative use test. 232 Under the transformative use
227 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding Cardtoons’ interest in publishing parody baseball cards outweighed the state’s
interest in protecting the right of publicity). In a few instances, other courts have employed the
balancing test. See, e.g., C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media
L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp.
2d 1146, 1182–83 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307,
313–14 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
228 Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 976. See also id. (“The application of the Oklahoma publicity
rights statute to Cardtoons’ trading cards presents a classic case of overprotection. Little is to be
gained, and much lost, by protecting MLBPA’s right to control the use of its members’ identities
in parody trading cards. The justifications for the right of publicity are not nearly as compelling as
those offered for other forms of intellectual property, and are particularly unpersuasive in the case
of celebrity parodies. The cards, on the other hand, are an important form of entertainment and
social commentary that deserve First Amendment protection.”).
229 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001).
230 See Tan, supra note 75, at 25 (“For courts that favor a participatory theory of democracy,
direct balancing can be used to examine how the presence of expressive content in the
defendant’s speech contributes to democratic deliberation and debate. If courts adopt the
balancing approach, they ought to consider, on the one hand, the content, form, and context of the
defendant’s speech and the benefit of the communication to both the defendant and the intended
recipient, and on the other hand, the harm to the celebrity individual in having his or her identity
used in that manner. This refined approach allows courts to examine the constitutional value of
the communication and better evaluate the relative benefits and harms to the parties in a claim.”);
Madow, supra note 69, at 367.
231 See Madow, supra note 69, at 367 (“Instead of a sterile and indeterminate debate on
whether the trading cards were ‘transformative,’ the [Cardtoons] court engaged in a serious, open
and remarkably nuanced weighing of the relevant social values in the particular case before it.
Although this approach has much to recommend it—especially when applied by a court as
sophisticated and sensitive to the competing interests as the one in Cardtoons—it may provide
too little predictability for would be-speakers. For this reason, a harder-edged categorical rule
might be preferable.”).
232 The test was used outside of California by the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir. 2013); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
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test, the inquiry focuses on whether the defendant’s use was sufficiently
transformative, namely “whether the work in question adds significant
creative elements so as to be transformed into something more than a
mere celebrity likeness or imitation.” 233 Works that do not meet the
transformative threshold are considered “knock-offs” and denied First
Amendment protection. 234
However, like the balancing test, the transformative use test
necessitates case-by-case determinations. 235 While a transformative use
standard may be clearer than a balancing test, this test is also flawed as
both over- and under-inclusive. The transformative use test results in the
overprotection of creative works that visually transform the
appropriated identity, and under-protection of works that directly
reference the celebrity’s image and rely on re-contextualization—rather
the visual transformation—to create new meanings. 236
3. The Predominant Purpose Test
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted
the predominant purpose test, which was first formulated in an article by
litigator Mark S. Lee. 237 This test denies First Amendment protection to
the appropriation of identity when the predominant purpose of the use
was to exploit the commercial value of the identity—regardless of the
level of expressive content in the resulting work. 238 The predominant
purpose test was expressly rejected in California, 239 and is largely
criticized as improperly placing the determination of the purpose of
creative works into the hands of the judiciary. 240
332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003).
233 Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 799. See Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003)
(holding a comic book that included cartoon depictions of real individuals and used their real
names and likenesses on cartoon worm bodies, was protected under the First Amendment because
it was sufficiently transformative and contained significant expressive content).
234 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810–11; White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding the reference to Vanna White was an untransformed visual
knock-off).
235 Leichtman, supra note 15, at 6.
236 Compare No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), with
Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 617 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also Madow,
supra note 69, at 368; Tan, supra note 75, at 28 (“[T]he usefulness of this test appears confined to
visual depictions of the plaintiff, and the extent to which the defendant’s use has departed from a
realistic rendition of the plaintiff’s likeness . . . . Hence the current test tends to overprotect
artistic speech but underprotect political speech despite the latter’s greater constitutional value.”).
237 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003); Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos:
Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L. REV. 471, 500 (2003).
238 Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
239 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 617.
240 See Tan, supra note 75, at 29–30.
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4. The Artistic Relevance Test
Another rarely applied minority test is the artistic relevance test,
which grants broader First Amendment protection to uses of identity
that have some artistic relevance to the underlying work. 241 Under this
test, if a court finds the use of identity contains no artistic relevance to
the underlying work, then the use is deemed misleading and denied First
Amendment protection. 242 Like the predominant purpose test, the
artistic relevance test is criticized for mandating inappropriate judicial
scrutiny of creative decisions. 243 Like the transformative use test, both
the predominant purpose test and the artistic relevance test underprotect conceptual appropriations.
V. PROPOSAL: A BROAD FAIR USE LIMIT ON REALITY TELEVISION STARS’
PUBLICITY RIGHTS
Reality television stars’ publicity rights should be subject to a
broad fair use defense because the line between a reality television
star’s identity and her constructed persona or character is unclear and
difficult to locate. 244 Since the line between character and identity is
vague in the world of reality television, broad reality star publicity
rights can conflict with federal copyright law by granting reality
television stars with affirmative rights over the characters they perform,
even though those rights generally belong to someone other than the
reality star. 245 Furthermore, the justifications for the right of publicity
do not explain why we as a society should grant reality television stars
with a legal monopoly over the use of their constructed personas—
especially given the large role of both production companies in
constructing the star and the public in taking notice and, as a result,
establishing the reality star’s secondary meaning as a celebrity. 246 The
justifications also fail to explain why we should grant the right of
publicity as a reward for the labor of exploiting a persona in the same
241
242

See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003).
243 Jonathan Bloom, Parks v. LaFace Records: A Symbol of Freedom Subverts Freedom of
Speech, 14 ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J. 15 (2003) (criticizing the use of the test in the Parks case).
244 See supra Part III.B.
245 See supra notes 159–163 and accompanying text. Notably, many elements of reality
television stars’ characters may be deemed components of stock characters, which are generally
not protected by copyright law under the doctrine of scènes à faire. See Gaiman v. MacFarlane,
360 F.3d 644, 659–61 (7th Cir. 2004). By allowing the right of publicity to protect elements that
federal copyright law leaves in the public domain, the right of publicity stands in direct conflict
with copyright law and arguably is preempted under Section 301 of the Copyright Act.
246 See supra notes 187–196 and accompanying text.
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manner that we reward the cultivation and promotion of an underlying
talent or skill. 247
A broad fair use test is needed because the current First
Amendment tests employed by courts lead to overprotect what is, in
effect, reality television stars’ constructed personas and characters.248
Even under a liberal balancing test, 249 a direct reference to a reality
television star’s identity may give rise to right of publicity liability if a
court finds that the value or amount of the commentary or criticism is
minimal. One problem with the current standards is that when reality
television stars perform on reality television shows they are often
already parodying themselves. 250 Therefore, a simple reference to a
reality star’s image, or some identifiable feature from one of her
performances, may operate as a criticism of or commentary on the star.
Such references are “parodies of parodies”—their critical content may
be quite clear, even if the author referencing the reality star does little
more then re-contextualize the star’s image. Without a fair use defense
that allows the public to reference a star whose public image already
functions as a parody, the right of publicity runs the risk of improperly
granting reality stars with monopolies over the use of and reference to
their constructed personas and characters.
A broad fair use test could solve this problem by treating any use
of a reality television star’s persona that falls short of “false

247 The Cardtoons court contemplated a categorical approach to the right of publicity when it
noted that athletes deserve publicity rights more than other celebrities. See supra note 185 and
accompanying text. Recently, the Third Circuit took into account the unique position of college
athletes as policy factors contributing to the balancing of interests in a right of publicity case.
The main factors the court considered were the athlete’s professional position and rank, his
chance for continued professional success, and his inability to monetize his fame while in a
college athletic program under NCAA rules. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 n.14
(3d Cir. 2013) (“[P]olicy considerations in this case weigh in favor of Appellant [athlete] . . .
intercollegiate athletes are forbidden from capitalizing on their fame while in school. Moreover,
the NCAA most recently estimated that less than one in 100, or 1.6 percent, of NCAA senior
football players will get drafted by a National Football League (NFL) team . . . Despite all of his
achievements, it should be noted that Ryan Hart was among the roughly ninety-nine percent who
were not drafted after graduation.”). While college athletes are prohibited from monetizing their
fame during their tenure as college athletes, reality show participants generally do not face such
restrictions and are free to enter endorsement deals and accept public appearance fees while still
in contract or season. In fact, self-promotion is often a reason to go on reality television. See, e.g.,
supra notes 134–141 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Parts III.A–B, IV.
249 See supra Part IV.B.I. (describing the balancing test and noting it is generally considered
the most liberal test currently in use).
250 The Cardtoons court noted that parodies of traditional celebrities function on two levels,
“[b]ecause celebrities are an important part of our public vocabulary, a parody of a celebrity does
not merely lampoon the celebrity, but exposes the weakness of the idea or value that the celebrity
symbolizes in society.” Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
972 (10th Cir. 1996). The parody of a reality star has potential to comment on at least three
levels: the individual, the stock character, and the reality industry as a whole.

Korotkin_ES Edit LK review post macro 10 3 2013 re macro and accepted all v3-1 (Do Not Delete)10/16/2013 8:59 AM

2013

FINDING REALITY IN THE R I G H T O F P U B L I C I TY

311

endorsement with the intent to deceive” as presumptively fair. 251 By
shifting the presumption towards fair use and away from broad reality
stars’ right of publicity protection, courts could ensure that the public
has access to use reality television stars’ images for commentary and
expressive purposes. 252 A broad fair use test would also limit the
exploitative use of the right of publicity in media stunts, where a reality
television star uses a barebones right of publicity claim to attract further
media attention and public recognition—or to extract early settlements.
While a broad fair use test would free courts from drawing lines
between constructed character and “identity,” courts would likely have
difficulty determining who counts as a reality television star and is thus
subject to a fair use test. One possible solution is to draw a categorical
line. For example, an individual who participates in one season of a
reality show could count as a reality television star. Or, one who has
done nothing with her fame since initiating performance on a reality
television show could remain classified as a reality television star,
regardless of the number of subsequent reality show performances. A
categorical approach would be easy to apply, but if the line is not drawn
with proper caution, it could wind up as over- or under-inclusive. 253
251 One reason to embrace such a presumption is to allow more “direct reference” commentary
uses of reality television stars’ images. Under the transformative use test, for example, a parody
work is only protected when the appropriation transforms the image, such as by transforming the
persona into a cartoon character. Although the Hilton case was not decided on the merits, the
court noted that the use of Paris Hilton’s actual face, as opposed to a cartoon face, trended away
from transformative use. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 890 (9th Cir. 2009), amended
and superseded, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010). Yet, powerful commentaries on reality television
stars often require direct reference to physical appearances. Arguably, many of these stars already
fall into stock character molds, therefore, transformative cartoon representations might not
adequately identify them as individuals as opposed to stock character molds.
The outcome for appropriation uses is even worse when the appropriation occurs not to
parody or comment on the individual star, but rather to comment on society as a whole. Given the
problematic results of the parody-satire divide in copyright fair use cases, in crafting a fair use
doctrine for the right of publicity, courts should broadly allow all forms of commentary in order
to avoid the problems of a parody-satire divide. See Juli Wilson Marshall et al., The
Satire/Parody Distinctions in Copyright and Trademark Law—Can Satire Ever Be Fair Use?,
ABA Section of Litig. Intell. Prop. Litig. Comm. (2006) (criticizing the parody-satire divide as
artificial for reasons including that: some parodies have satiric components, while some satires
have parodic components; copyright owners are not necessarily averse to licensing parodies,
while quick to license a satiric social commentary; and courts should not pass judgment on the
literary meaning and aesthetics of a work, which is required in order to determine whether the
work at issue is a parody or satire).
252 Cardtoons, L.C., 95 F.3d at 976 (“Moreover, fame is a double-edged sword—the law
cannot allow those who enjoy the public limelight to so easily avoid the ridicule and criticism that
sometimes accompany public prominence.”).
253 For example, a person with prior or subsequent fame for a reason other than their
participation in a reality television show might be improperly captured under a one-season test.
Further, a test that focuses on what the reality star did with her fame after the show could
improperly vest the judiciary with a mandate to judge the personal and professional choices of the
star in order to determine the star’s available legal remedies. Such a judgment would reek of
impropriety and judicial bias and would thus undermine the ultimate decision.
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Another approach is to look at the plaintiff’s underlying skills and
labor in order to determine whether a fair use test should apply. Here,
the fair use test would only apply when an individual’s fame is based
primarily on the exploitation of a persona, rather than a cultivated
underlying talent or skill that is subsequently promoted.
If categorical line drawing or a look to the underlying talents
produces inaccurate results, then courts could more broadly focus on the
character-identity line. 254 This approach would conceptually borrow
from copyright law’s merger doctrine, which limits copyright protection
in instances where an idea merges with the expression. 255 In the
publicity context, protection could be withheld when identity “merges,”
or is inseparable from, a constructed persona or character.
While the adoption of a fair use test, like all balancing tests, will
place some burden on the courts, the limitation on publicity rights in
these cases would be fair and reasonable. A limitation on reality
television stars’ claims would not leave these stars without legal rights,
particularly because the Lanham Act would remain available to protect
against deceptive uses of the stars’ personas, and various state laws
would continue to protect against unfair competition and defamation.256
The fair use test also strikes a sensible chord between the extremes of a
bright line rule that grants broad publicity rights to everyone—while
stifling the public domain and leading to censorship and unjust
enrichment—and an unrealistic attempt to abolish the right of publicity
in its entirety, which, given the power of the publicity lobby, 257 is not
likely to occur in the near future.
CONCLUSION
Just as Nimmer noted in 1954 that the right to privacy must evolve
254
255

See supra Part III.B.
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1879); id. at 107 (“[T]he mere copyright
of Selden’s book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and use account-books,
ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and illustrated in said book.”); Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (“The critical
distinction between ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ is difficult to draw . . . . The guiding consideration in
drawing the line is the preservation of the balance between competition and protection reflected
in the patent and copyright laws . . . . What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright
owner’s monopoly—from how large an area of activity did Congress intend to allow the
copyright owner to exclude others? We think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger
private preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in the public market without a patent. A
jeweled bee pin is therefore an ‘idea’ that defendants were free to copy.”); Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that the expression of the rules of a
sweepstakes contest was inseparable from the idea of the contest itself, and therefore not
protectable by copyright law).
256 See supra Part II.C.
257 See supra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
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to recognize the needs of Broadway and Hollywood, 258 perhaps the time
has now come for the right of publicity to evolve and recognize the
public’s need to access and reference the identity of those who are
merely “famous for being famous.” 259

258
259

See Nimmer, supra note 21.
See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2010).

